MSTCAD空間網格結構設計軟體另類解狗 (41千字)
破解目標：MSTCAD空間網格結構設計軟體
工具：W32DASM，fi3.01，UltraEdit8.0，ollydbg1.09d
目的：狗不理，不理狗
軟體簡介：空間網格結構近二十幾年來已經得到了廣泛的應用和發展，這一方面是由於這種結構具有空間受力特性、建築造型豐富、重量輕、材料省、產品工廠化、施工安裝方便、工程質量高、工期短等優點，另一方面，計算機的廣泛應用和普及、計算技術的漸趨成熟、軟體的不斷研製和開發也為空間網格結構的應用和發展奠定了基礎。
該軟體可在其主頁公開下載，不須帶狗即可安裝，但須帶狗執行。其幫助中說明“設計版主要進行施工圖設計，企業版包括設計版所有內容外，還針對加工製作需要，進行節點翻樣、統計計算等。專業版.....”
開工：
先用fi3.01檢查沒有加殼，再看安裝幫助檔案，發現是升級版，就是說還是原來的老狗（見我的上篇破文看雪論壇精華5裡有）。
軟體在執行時，如果沒有狗，則會跳出一個需要註冊的對話方塊"沒有找到加密器。"，和原來一樣，怎麼還沒有改變啊。那就先用 W32dsm 看看，反編譯成功後，在串式參考查詢出錯的資訊"沒有找到加密器。"，
找到下面
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A60B5(U)
|
:004A5EE0 6AFF push FFFFFFFF
:004A5EE2 683B495300 push 0053493B
:004A5EE7 64A100000000 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000000]
:004A5EED 50 push eax
:004A5EEE 64892500000000 mov dword ptr fs:[00000000], esp
:004A5EF5 81EC04010000 sub esp, 00000104
:004A5EFB 56 push esi
:004A5EFC 57 push edi
:004A5EFD 33FF xor edi, edi
:004A5EFF 8BF1 mov esi, ecx
:004A5F01 57 push edi
:004A5F02 8974240C mov dword ptr [esp+0C], esi
:004A5F06 E885D40700 call 00523390
:004A5F0B 8D44240C lea eax, dword ptr [esp+0C]
:004A5F0F 89BC2414010000 mov dword ptr [esp+00000114], edi
:004A5F16 50 push eax
:004A5F17 6800010000 push 00000100
:004A5F1C C706F06F5400 mov dword ptr [esi], 00546FF0
* Reference To: KERNEL32.GetCurrentDirectoryA, Ord:00F5h
|
:004A5F22 FF15A8A35300 Call dword ptr [0053A3A8]
:004A5F28 8D4C240C lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+0C]
:004A5F2C 51 push ecx
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"%s"
|
:004A5F2D 6824C45600 push 0056C424
:004A5F32 68E8E94C03 push 034CE9E8
:004A5F37 E8C22B0600 call 00508AFE
:004A5F3C 83C40C add esp, 0000000C
:004A5F3F 8BCE mov ecx, esi
:004A5F41 E8CA080000 call 004A6810
:004A5F46 83F801 cmp eax, 00000001
:004A5F49 0F85CA000000 jne 004A6019
:004A5F4F 8986C0D59201 mov dword ptr [esi+0192D5C0], eax
:004A5F55 C705B4EA4C0302000000 mov dword ptr [034CEAB4], 00000002
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A6062(C) ====>成功，來到這裡，前提是上面的
|
:004A5F5F 8BCE mov ecx, esi
:004A5F61 E86A040000 call 004A63D0
:004A5F66 B9C0C0C000 mov ecx, 00C0C0C0
:004A5F6B B880808000 mov eax, 00808080
:004A5F70 890DDC321102 mov dword ptr [021132DC], ecx
:004A5F76 890DE0321102 mov dword ptr [021132E0], ecx
:004A5F7C 890DEC321102 mov dword ptr [021132EC], ecx
:004A5F82 890DF0321102 mov dword ptr [021132F0], ecx
:004A5F88 8B8C240C010000 mov ecx, dword ptr [esp+0000010C]
:004A5F8F 893DB4321102 mov dword ptr [021132B4], edi
:004A5F95 A3B8321102 mov dword ptr [021132B8], eax
:004A5F9A A3BC321102 mov dword ptr [021132BC], eax
:004A5F9F A3C0321102 mov dword ptr [021132C0], eax
:004A5FA4 893DCC321102 mov dword ptr [021132CC], edi
:004A5FAA 893DC8321102 mov dword ptr [021132C8], edi
:004A5FB0 893DD4321102 mov dword ptr [021132D4], edi
:004A5FB6 A3D8321102 mov dword ptr [021132D8], eax
:004A5FBB 893DE4321102 mov dword ptr [021132E4], edi
:004A5FC1 A3E8321102 mov dword ptr [021132E8], eax
:004A5FC6 A3F4321102 mov dword ptr [021132F4], eax
:004A5FCB A3F8321102 mov dword ptr [021132F8], eax
:004A5FD0 A3FC321102 mov dword ptr [021132FC], eax
:004A5FD5 8BC6 mov eax, esi
:004A5FD7 5F pop edi
:004A5FD8 C705A8321102400D0300 mov dword ptr [021132A8], 00030D40
:004A5FE2 C705AC3211020A000000 mov dword ptr [021132AC], 0000000A
:004A5FEC C705B032110201000000 mov dword ptr [021132B0], 00000001
:004A5FF6 C705C432110201000000 mov dword ptr [021132C4], 00000001
:004A6000 C705D032110202000000 mov dword ptr [021132D0], 00000002
:004A600A 5E pop esi
:004A600B 64890D00000000 mov dword ptr fs:[00000000], ecx
:004A6012 81C410010000 add esp, 00000110
:004A6018 C3 ret
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A5F49(C)
|
:004A6019 8BCE mov ecx, esi
:004A601B 89BEC0D59201 mov dword ptr [esi+0192D5C0], edi
:004A6021 E85A050000 call 004A6580 ====>檢查狗的call，進去看看，哈哈，花指令好多，可是有什麼用？！
:004A6026 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A6028 7512 jne 004A603C ====>檢測狗成功，就跳了 004A603C
:004A602A 57 push edi
:004A602B 57 push edi
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"沒有找到加密器。" ---->就是這裡啦！沒變化啊。
;;找到這不難，難在不能走彎路，那我麼這次要好好看看了。 |
:004A602C 68A8205700 push 005720A8
:004A6031 E87A0C0700 call 00516CB0
:004A6036 57 push edi
:004A6037 E8943B0500 call 004F9BD0
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A6028(C)
|
:004A603C 8BCE mov ecx, esi ====>檢測狗成功到這，還沒有完呢。
:004A603E E85D050000 call 004A65A0 ====>後面的call，裡面還有檢測，其中還要查狗，確定是設計，企業版。進去看看吧
:004A6043 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A6045 7512 jne 004A6059
:004A6047 57 push edi
:004A6048 57 push edi
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"非合法使用者，軟體無法使用。"====>到這裡就玩完！
|
:004A6049 688C205700 push 0057208C
:004A604E E85D0C0700 call 00516CB0
:004A6053 57 push edi
:004A6054 E8773B0500 call 004F9BD0
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A6045(C)
|
:004A6059 8BCE mov ecx, esi
:004A605B E8A0090000 call 004A6A00 ====>檢測時間。在2003-2004之間能用
:004A6060 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A6062 0F85F7FEFFFF jne 004A5F5F ====>成功跳
:004A6068 57 push edi
:004A6069 E8623B0500 call 004F9BD0
:004A606E 90 nop
:004A606F 90 nop
:004A6070 56 push esi
:004A6071 8BF1 mov esi, ecx
:004A6073 E818000000 call 004A6090
:004A6078 F644240801 test [esp+08], 01
:004A607D 7409 je 004A6088
:004A607F 56 push esi
:004A6080 E8E04E0600 call 0050AF65
:004A6085 83C404 add esp, 00000004
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A607D(C)
|
:004A6088 8BC6 mov eax, esi
:004A608A 5E pop esi
:004A608B C20400 ret 0004
:004A608E 90 nop
:004A608F 90 nop
* Referenced by a CALL at Address:
|:004A6073
|
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A60D5(U)
|
:004A6090 E92CD70700 jmp 005237C1
:004A6095 90 nop ====>看到這些90嗎，這次他們可能忘了放花指令了，留下這些空。不過，這些花指令其實也沒用，因為他前面自己留下了漏洞。
:004A6096 90 nop
:004A6097 90 nop
:004A6098 90 nop
:004A6099 90 nop
:004A609A 90 nop
:004A609B 90 nop
:004A609C 90 nop
:004A609D 90 nop
:004A609E 90 nop
:004A609F 90 nop
:004A60A0 E80B000000 call 004A60B0
:004A60A5 E916000000 jmp 004A60C0
:004A60AA 90 nop
:004A60AB 90 nop
:004A60AC 90 nop
:004A60AD 90 nop
:004A60AE 90 nop
:004A60AF 90 nop
* Referenced by a CALL at Address:
|:004A60A0
|
:004A60B0 B9C0965700 mov ecx, 005796C0
:004A60B5 E926FEFFFF jmp 004A5EE0
:004A60BA 90 nop
:004A60BB 90 nop
:004A60BC 90 nop
:004A60BD 90 nop
:004A60BE 90 nop
:004A60BF 90 nop
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A60A5(U)
|
:004A60C0 68D0604A00 push 004A60D0
:004A60C5 E80F340500 call 004F94D9
:004A60CA 59 pop ecx
:004A60CB C3 ret
:004A60CC 90 nop
:004A60CD 90 nop
:004A60CE 90 nop
:004A60CF 90 nop
:004A60D0 B9C0965700 mov ecx, 005796C0
:004A60D5 E9B6FFFFFF jmp 004A6090
:004A60DA 90 nop
:004A60DB 90 nop
:004A60DC 90 nop
:004A60DD 90 nop
:004A60DE 90 nop
:004A60DF 90 nop
:004A60E0 6AFF push FFFFFFFF
:004A60E2 686A495300 push 0053496A
................省略
以下是 "非合法使用者，軟體無法使用。"的call，我們看看
* Referenced by a CALL at Addresses:
|:004A603E , :004B5AC4 我們看到的call，有2個，就是第2個再作怪，我沒開始注意到，當然也是因為我不是土建專業，不會用這個軟體，所以沒有發現錯誤。另外還有2處，call 004A6580，call 004A6810也是一樣，都是關於狗。當然破解方法也不同了。
在此感謝發現補丁bug的同志提醒，謝謝。
|
:004A65A0 6AFF push FFFFFFFF
:004A65A2 68184A5300 push 00534A18
:004A65A7 64A100000000 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000000]
:004A65AD 50 push eax
:004A65AE 64892500000000 mov dword ptr fs:[00000000], esp
:004A65B5 83EC10 sub esp, 00000010
:004A65B8 53 push ebx
:004A65B9 56 push esi
:004A65BA 33DB xor ebx, ebx ====>ebx＝0
:004A65BC 8D44240C lea eax, dword ptr [esp+0C]
:004A65C0 8BF1 mov esi, ecx
:004A65C2 C70518EA4C032A030000 mov dword ptr [034CEA18], 0000032A
:004A65CC 881D10EA4C03 mov byte ptr [034CEA10], bl
:004A65D2 A30CEA4C03 mov dword ptr [034CEA0C], eax
:004A65D7 66C7051CEA4C034D00 mov word ptr [034CEA1C], 004D
:004A65E0 66C7051EEA4C030800 mov word ptr [034CEA1E], 0008
:004A65E9 885C2414 mov byte ptr [esp+14], bl
:004A65ED E87E16F6FF call 00407C70 ====>！就是這，進去又查狗
:004A65F2 3BC3 cmp eax, ebx ====>！比較eax，ebx，不等就跳
:004A65F4 0F857A010000 jne 004A6774 ====>一跳就玩完了
:004A65FA 8B0D545E5700 mov ecx, dword ptr [00575E54]
:004A6600 894C2408 mov dword ptr [esp+08], ecx
:004A6604 8D54240C lea edx, dword ptr [esp+0C]
:004A6608 8D442408 lea eax, dword ptr [esp+08]
:004A660C 52 push edx
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"%s"
|
:004A660D 6824C45600 push 0056C424
:004A6612 50 push eax
:004A6613 895C242C mov dword ptr [esp+2C], ebx
:004A6617 E8E2240600 call 00508AFE
:004A661C 83C40C add esp, 0000000C
:004A661F 8D4C2408 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+08]
:004A6623 53 push ebx
====>以下就是檢測學習版，設計版，企業版的
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"Luo98202"
|
:004A6624 683C215700 push 0057213C
:004A6629 E89D210600 call 005087CB
:004A662E 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A6630 0F8D2D010000 jnl 004A6763
:004A6636 53 push ebx
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"Luo98437"
|
:004A6637 6830215700 push 00572130
:004A663C 8D4C2410 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+10]
:004A6640 E886210600 call 005087CB
:004A6645 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A6647 0F8D16010000 jnl 004A6763
:004A664D 53 push ebx
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"Luo98"
|
:004A664E 6828215700 push 00572128
:004A6653 8D4C2410 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+10]
:004A6657 E86F210600 call 005087CB
:004A665C 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A665E 7D17 jge 004A6677
:004A6660 53 push ebx
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"Luo01"
|
:004A6661 6820215700 push 00572120
:004A6666 8D4C2410 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+10]
:004A666A E85C210600 call 005087CB
:004A666F 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A6671 0F8CEC000000 jl 004A6763
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A665E(C)
|
:004A6677 53 push ebx
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"Luo984"
|
:004A6678 6818215700 push 00572118
:004A667D 8D4C2410 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+10]
:004A6681 E845210600 call 005087CB
:004A6686 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A6688 0F8D9A000000 jnl 004A6728
:004A668E 53 push ebx
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"Luo985"
|
:004A668F 6810215700 push 00572110
:004A6694 8D4C2410 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+10]
:004A6698 E82E210600 call 005087CB
:004A669D 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A669F 0F8D83000000 jnl 004A6728
:004A66A5 53 push ebx
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"Luo014"
|
:004A66A6 6808215700 push 00572108
:004A66AB 8D4C2410 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+10]
:004A66AF E817210600 call 005087CB
:004A66B4 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A66B6 7D70 jge 004A6728
:004A66B8 53 push ebx
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"Luo01395"
|
:004A66B9 68FC205700 push 005720FC
:004A66BE 8D4C2410 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+10]
:004A66C2 E804210600 call 005087CB
:004A66C7 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A66C9 7D5D jge 004A6728
:004A66CB 53 push ebx
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"Luo982"
|
:004A66CC 68F4205700 push 005720F4
:004A66D1 8D4C2410 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+10]
:004A66D5 E8F1200600 call 005087CB
:004A66DA 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A66DC 7D13 jge 004A66F1
:004A66DE 53 push ebx
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"Luo012"
|
:004A66DF 68EC205700 push 005720EC
:004A66E4 8D4C2410 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+10]
:004A66E8 E8DE200600 call 005087CB
:004A66ED 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A66EF 7C72 jl 004A6763
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A66DC(C)
| ====>跳到這裡就是MST 2003(設計版)
:004A66F1 C705B4EA4C0301000000 mov dword ptr [034CEAB4], 00000001 ====>讓dword ptr [034CEAB4]等於2
:004A66FB 8D4C2408 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+08]
:004A66FF 899EC0D59201 mov dword ptr [esi+0192D5C0], ebx ====>讓dword ptr [esi+0192D5C0]等於ebx，估計是0
:004A6705 C7442420FFFFFFFF mov [esp+20], FFFFFFFF
:004A670D E8EE860600 call 0050EE00
:004A6712 5E pop esi
:004A6713 B801000000 mov eax, 00000001
:004A6718 5B pop ebx
:004A6719 8B4C2410 mov ecx, dword ptr [esp+10]
:004A671D 64890D00000000 mov dword ptr fs:[00000000], ecx
:004A6724 83C41C add esp, 0000001C
:004A6727 C3 ret
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Addresses:
|:004A6688(C), :004A669F(C), :004A66B6(C), :004A66C9(C)
| ====>跳到這裡就是MST 2003(企業版)
:004A6728 C705B4EA4C0302000000 mov dword ptr [034CEAB4], 00000002 ====>讓dword ptr [034CEAB4]等於2
:004A6732 8D4C2408 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+08]
:004A6736 C786C0D5920101000000 mov dword ptr [esi+0192D5C0], 00000001 ====>讓dword ptr [esi+0192D5C0]等於1
:004A6740 C7442420FFFFFFFF mov [esp+20], FFFFFFFF
:004A6748 E8B3860600 call 0050EE00
:004A674D 5E pop esi
:004A674E B801000000 mov eax, 00000001
:004A6753 5B pop ebx
:004A6754 8B4C2410 mov ecx, dword ptr [esp+10]
:004A6758 64890D00000000 mov dword ptr fs:[00000000], ecx
:004A675F 83C41C add esp, 0000001C
:004A6762 C3 ret
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Addresses:
|:004A6630(C), :004A6647(C), :004A6671(C), :004A66EF(C)
| ====>跳到這裡就是MST 2003(學習版)
:004A6763 8D4C2408 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+08] ====>什麼不作，dword ptr [034CEAB4]，dword ptr [esi+0192D5C0]等於初始值，當然為0！！！
:004A6767 C7442420FFFFFFFF mov [esp+20], FFFFFFFF
:004A676F E88C860600 call 0050EE00
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A65F4(C)
| ====>一跳到這裡就玩完了
:004A6774 8B4C2418 mov ecx, dword ptr [esp+18]
:004A6778 5E pop esi
:004A6779 33C0 xor eax, eax
:004A677B 5B pop ebx
:004A677C 64890D00000000 mov dword ptr fs:[00000000], ecx
:004A6783 83C41C add esp, 0000001C
:004A6786 C3 ret
:004A6787 90 nop
:004A6788 90 nop
:004A6789 90 nop
:004A678A 90 nop
:004A678B 90 nop
:004A678C 90 nop
:004A678D 90 nop
:004A678E 90 nop
:004A678F 90 nop
:004A6790 8BC1 mov eax, ecx
:004A6792 8B4C2404 mov ecx, dword ptr [esp+04]
:004A6796 8B80C0D59201 mov eax, dword ptr [eax+0192D5C0]
:004A679C 8B11 mov edx, dword ptr [ecx]
:004A679E 50 push eax
:004A679F FF12 call dword ptr [edx]
:004A67A1 C20400 ret 0004
:004A67A4 90 nop
:004A67A5 90 nop
:004A67A6 90 nop
:004A67A7 90 nop
:004A67A8 90 nop
:004A67A9 90 nop
:004A67AA 90 nop
:004A67AB 90 nop
:004A67AC 90 nop
:004A67AD 90 nop
:004A67AE 90 nop
:004A67AF 90 nop
:004A67B0 56 push esi
:004A67B1 8BF1 mov esi, ecx
:004A67B3 E8A0970600 call 0050FF58
:004A67B8 A1B4EA4C03 mov eax, dword ptr [034CEAB4]
:004A67BD 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A67BF 750D jne 004A67CE
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"MST 2003(學習版)" ====>！就是這，往下看！！！！！
|
:004A67C1 6870215700 push 00572170
:004A67C6 8D4E5C lea ecx, dword ptr [esi+5C]
:004A67C9 E8BB870600 call 0050EF89
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A67BF(C)
|
:004A67CE 833DB4EA4C0301 cmp dword ptr [034CEAB4], 00000001
:004A67D5 750D jne 004A67E4
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"MST 2003(設計版)"
|
:004A67D7 685C215700 push 0057215C
:004A67DC 8D4E5C lea ecx, dword ptr [esi+5C]
:004A67DF E8A5870600 call 0050EF89
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A67D5(C)
|
:004A67E4 833DB4EA4C0302 cmp dword ptr [034CEAB4], 00000002
:004A67EB 750D jne 004A67FA
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"MST 2003(企業版)"
|
:004A67ED 6848215700 push 00572148
:004A67F2 8D4E5C lea ecx, dword ptr [esi+5C]
:004A67F5 E88F870600 call 0050EF89
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A67EB(C)
|
:004A67FA 6A00 push 00000000
:004A67FC 8BCE mov ecx, esi
:004A67FE E806700600 call 0050D809
:004A6803 B801000000 mov eax, 00000001
:004A6808 5E pop esi
:004A6809 C3 ret
.....省略
以下是 檢測時間的call，我們看看
* Referenced by a CALL at Address:
|:004A605B
|
:004A6A00 83EC08 sub esp, 00000008
:004A6A03 8D442404 lea eax, dword ptr [esp+04]
:004A6A07 50 push eax
:004A6A08 E8EB2B0500 call 004F95F8 ====>獲得系統時間的call
:004A6A0D 8B4C2408 mov ecx, dword ptr [esp+08]
:004A6A11 83C404 add esp, 00000004
:004A6A14 894C2400 mov dword ptr [esp], ecx
:004A6A18 8D4C2400 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp]
:004A6A1C 6A00 push 00000000
:004A6A1E E854280600 call 00509277
:004A6A23 6A00 push 00000000
:004A6A25 8D4C2404 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+04]
:004A6A29 E849280600 call 00509277
:004A6A2E 6A00 push 00000000
:004A6A30 8D4C2404 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+04]
:004A6A34 E83E280600 call 00509277
:004A6A39 8B4014 mov eax, dword ptr [eax+14]
:004A6A3C 056C070000 add eax, 0000076C
:004A6A41 3DD4070000 cmp eax, 000007D4 ====>7D4十進位制為2004
:004A6A46 7E14 jle 004A6A5C ====>不大於2004年跳下去
:004A6A48 6A00 push 00000000
:004A6A4A 6A00 push 00000000
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"您的軟體應該升級了.請到www.mstcenter.com下載!"
|
:004A6A4C 6804225700 push 00572204
:004A6A51 E85A020700 call 00516CB0
:004A6A56 33C0 xor eax, eax
:004A6A58 83C408 add esp, 00000008
:004A6A5B C3 ret
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A6A46(C)
|
:004A6A5C 3DD3070000 cmp eax, 000007D3 ====>7D3十進位制為2003
:004A6A61 7E0E jle 004A6A71 ====>不大於2003年跳下去,我覺得這是作者的筆誤，應該是大於跳，否則沒意義了。
:004A6A63 6A00 push 00000000
:004A6A65 6A00 push 00000000
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"您的軟體應該升級了.請到www.mstcenter.com下載!"
|
:004A6A67 6804225700 push 00572204
:004A6A6C E83F020700 call 00516CB0
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A6A61(C)
|
:004A6A71 B801000000 mov eax, 00000001 ====>成功標誌，eax＝1
:004A6A76 83C408 add esp, 00000008
:004A6A79 C3 ret
我們分析了以上，就明白，要獲得企業版，那末就要檢測狗成功並{讓dword ptr [034CEAB4]等於2，讓dword ptr [esi+0192D5C0]等於1},系統時間在2003-2004之間，當然現在小於2004就行。
這時我們在回頭看看，發現這和我的上篇破文【看雪論壇精華5】一樣啊，對，上次我是初學破解，很多不明白，現在我好像又更深一步了。
我們再來看看最前面的
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"%s"
|
:004A5F2D 6824C45600 push 0056C424
:004A5F32 68E8E94C03 push 034CE9E8
:004A5F37 E8C22B0600 call 00508AFE
:004A5F3C 83C40C add esp, 0000000C
:004A5F3F 8BCE mov ecx, esi
:004A5F41 E8CA080000 call 004A6810 ====>這次我們看看這個call的作用
:004A5F46 83F801 cmp eax, 00000001
:004A5F49 0F85CA000000 jne 004A6019 ====>關鍵的跳
:004A5F4F 8986C0D59201 mov dword ptr [esi+0192D5C0], eax
:004A5F55 C705B4EA4C0302000000 mov dword ptr [034CEAB4], 00000002
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A6062(C) ====>成功，來到這裡，前提是上面的，從004A6062跳來的，
|
:004A5F5F 8BCE mov ecx, esi
:004A5F61 E86A040000 call 004A63D0
:004A5F66 B9C0C0C000 mov ecx, 00C0C0C0
:004A5F6B B880808000 mov eax, 00808080
:004A5F70 890DDC321102 mov dword ptr [021132DC], ecx
:004A5F76 890DE0321102 mov dword ptr [021132E0], ecx
..............省
====>call 004A6810 這次我們看看這個call的作用
* Referenced by a CALL at Addresses:
|:004A5F41 , :004B5AA3 我們看到的call，有2個，就是第2個在作怪，我開始沒注意到，
|
:004A6810 6AFF push FFFFFFFF
:004A6812 68464A5300 push 00534A46
:004A6817 64A100000000 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000000]
:004A681D 50 push eax
:004A681E 64892500000000 mov dword ptr fs:[00000000], esp
:004A6825 81EC80000000 sub esp, 00000080
:004A682B 8D442404 lea eax, dword ptr [esp+04]
:004A682F 8D4C241C lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+1C]
:004A6833 50 push eax
:004A6834 51 push ecx
:004A6835 C744240C90010000 mov [esp+0C], 00000190
* Reference To: KERNEL32.GetComputerNameA, Ord:00CEh ====>獲得你的
|
:004A683D FF1594A35300 Call dword ptr [0053A394]
:004A6843 8B15545E5700 mov edx, dword ptr [00575E54]
:004A6849 89542400 mov dword ptr [esp], edx
:004A684D 8D44241C lea eax, dword ptr [esp+1C]
:004A6851 8D4C2400 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp] ====>ecx就是你的計算機名
:004A6855 50 push eax
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"%s"
|
:004A6856 6824C45600 push 0056C424
:004A685B 51 push ecx
:004A685C C784249400000000000000 mov dword ptr [esp+00000094], 00000000
:004A6867 E892220600 call 00508AFE
:004A686C 83C40C add esp, 0000000C
:004A686F 8D4C2400 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp]
:004A6873 6A00 push 00000000
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"OEMCOMPUTER" ====>計算機名的比較，以下都是
|
:004A6875 68F8215700 push 005721F8
:004A687A E84C1F0600 call 005087CB
:004A687F 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A6881 0F84EB000000 je 004A6972 ====>跳！？
:004A6887 6A00 push 00000000
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"147"
|
:004A6889 68F4215700 push 005721F4
:004A688E 8D4C2408 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+08]
:004A6892 E8341F0600 call 005087CB
:004A6897 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A6899 0F84D3000000 je 004A6972
:004A689F 6A00 push 00000000
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"ANSYS"
|
:004A68A1 68EC215700 push 005721EC
:004A68A6 8D4C2408 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+08]
:004A68AA E81C1F0600 call 005087CB
:004A68AF 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A68B1 0F84BB000000 je 004A6972
:004A68B7 6A00 push 00000000
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"MSTCAD" ====>計算機名的比較，以下都是
|
:004A68B9 68E4215700 push 005721E4
:004A68BE 8D4C2408 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+08]
:004A68C2 E8041F0600 call 005087CB
:004A68C7 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A68C9 0F84A3000000 je 004A6972
:004A68CF 6A00 push 00000000
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"MST"
|
:004A68D1 68E0215700 push 005721E0
:004A68D6 8D4C2408 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+08]
:004A68DA E8EC1E0600 call 005087CB
:004A68DF 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A68E1 0F848B000000 je 004A6972
:004A68E7 6A00 push 00000000
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"FAZURE"
|
:004A68E9 68D8215700 push 005721D8
:004A68EE 8D4C2408 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+08]
:004A68F2 E8D41E0600 call 005087CB
:004A68F7 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A68F9 7477 je 004A6972
:004A68FB 6A00 push 00000000
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"WCZGN"
|
:004A68FD 68D0215700 push 005721D0
:004A6902 8D4C2408 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+08]
:004A6906 E8C01E0600 call 005087CB
:004A690B 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A690D 7463 je 004A6972
:004A690F 6A00 push 00000000
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"JAVAS"
|
:004A6911 68C8215700 push 005721C8
:004A6916 8D4C2408 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+08]
:004A691A E8AC1E0600 call 005087CB
:004A691F 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A6921 744F je 004A6972
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"LDD"
|
:004A6923 68C4215700 push 005721C4
:004A6928 8D4C2404 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+04]
:004A692C E88C1E0600 call 005087BD
:004A6931 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A6933 743D je 004A6972
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"7-208"
|
:004A6935 68BC215700 push 005721BC
:004A693A 8D4C2404 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+04]
:004A693E E87A1E0600 call 005087BD
:004A6943 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A6945 742B je 004A6972 ====>如果到這裡還不同，那
:004A6947 8D4C2400 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp]
:004A694B C7842488000000FFFFFFFF mov dword ptr [esp+00000088], FFFFFFFF
:004A6956 E8A5840600 call 0050EE00
:004A695B 33C0 xor eax, eax ====>如果到這裡還不同，那eax請零，返回失敗
:004A695D 8B8C2480000000 mov ecx, dword ptr [esp+00000080]
:004A6964 64890D00000000 mov dword ptr fs:[00000000], ecx
:004A696B 81C48C000000 add esp, 0000008C
:004A6971 C3 ret ====>，返回
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Addresses:
|:004A6881(C), :004A6899(C), :004A68B1(C), :004A68C9(C), :004A68E1(C)
|:004A68F9(C), :004A690D(C), :004A6921(C), :004A6933(C), :004A6945(C)
|
:004A6972 56 push esi
:004A6973 8D4C240C lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+0C]
:004A6977 E89D890600 call 0050F319
:004A697C 6A00 push 00000000
:004A697E 6A00 push 00000000
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"c:\windows\help\m$.TMP.txt"
|
:004A6980 68A0215700 push 005721A0
:004A6985 8D4C2418 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+18]
:004A6989 C684249800000001 mov byte ptr [esp+00000098], 01
:004A6991 E8F8890600 call 0050F38E
:004A6996 8BF0 mov esi, eax
:004A6998 85F6 test esi, esi
:004A699A 7512 jne 004A69AE
:004A699C 50 push eax
:004A699D 50 push eax
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"c:\winnt\help\m$.TMP.txt"
|
:004A699E 6884215700 push 00572184
:004A69A3 8D4C2418 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+18]
:004A69A7 E8E2890600 call 0050F38E
:004A69AC 8BF0 mov esi, eax
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A699A(C)
|
:004A69AE 83FE01 cmp esi, 00000001
:004A69B1 7509 jne 004A69BC
:004A69B3 8D4C240C lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+0C]
:004A69B7 E8028D0600 call 0050F6BE
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A69B1(C)
|
:004A69BC 8D4C240C lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+0C]
:004A69C0 C684248C00000000 mov byte ptr [esp+0000008C], 00
:004A69C8 E87E890600 call 0050F34B ====>可能是關鍵call
:004A69CD 8D4C2404 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+04]
:004A69D1 C784248C000000FFFFFFFF mov dword ptr [esp+0000008C], FFFFFFFF
:004A69DC E81F840600 call 0050EE00
:004A69E1 8B8C2484000000 mov ecx, dword ptr [esp+00000084]
:004A69E8 8BC6 mov eax, esi ====>到這裡，esi的值給eax，如果是1，那就辦了
:004A69EA 5E pop esi
:004A69EB 64890D00000000 mov dword ptr fs:[00000000], ecx
:004A69F2 81C48C000000 add esp, 0000008C
:004A69F8 C3 ret
看來作者自己留下了一個後門，就是有以上這些名字的機器，可以不帶狗執行，當然還要驗證。可能是他們開發組的區域網裡的機器，我猜。
我沒搞明白驗證過程，不過我們直接讓eax＝1，就行了。這次我明白為什麼我們改起來這麼容易了。
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"%s"
|
:004A5F2D 6824C45600 push 0056C424
:004A5F32 68E8E94C03 push 034CE9E8
:004A5F37 E8C22B0600 call 00508AFE
:004A5F3C 83C40C add esp, 0000000C
:004A5F3F 8BCE mov ecx, esi
:004A5F41 E8CA080000 call 004A6810 ====>這個關鍵call的作用，可以返回eax，那我們讓eax＝1
:004A5F46 83F801 cmp eax, 00000001 ====>注意：以前改這裡為mov eax, 00000001
:004A5F49 0F85CA000000 jne 004A6019 ====>注意：以前關鍵的跳，我們不跳，改為nop
:004A5F4F 8986C0D59201 mov dword ptr [esi+0192D5C0], eax ====>那末dword ptr [esi+0192D5C0]＝1
:004A5F55 C705B4EA4C0302000000 mov dword ptr [034CEAB4], 00000002 ====>那末dword ptr [034CEAB4]＝2
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A6062(C) ====>那末成功，我們直接來到這裡，連時間檢測也免了，^_^
|
:004A5F5F 8BCE mov ecx, esi
:004A5F61 E86A040000 call 004A63D0
:004A5F66 B9C0C0C000 mov ecx, 00C0C0C0
:004A5F6B B880808000 mov eax, 00808080
:004A5F70 890DDC321102 mov dword ptr [021132DC], ecx
:004A5F76 890DE0321102 mov dword ptr [021132E0], ecx
..............省
但是這次，我們不能了，他這次改變了加密，看到那些增加的Call就知道，他現在還在程式執行中增加了檢查！！
至於增加的call是怎樣運作的，我們不管了，總之都是陷阱，我們跳過去就行了。
我們分析了以上，就明白，要獲得企業版，那末就要檢測狗成功並{讓dword ptr [034CEAB4]等於2，讓dword ptr [esi+0192D5C0]等於1},系統時間在2003-2004之間，當然現在小於2004就行。
這時我們在回頭看看，進去Call再改！
====>call 004A6810 這次我們看看這個call的作用
* Referenced by a CALL at Addresses:
|:004A5F41 , :004B5AA3 注意，2個地方呼叫這個call！！！！！
|
:004A6810 6AFF push FFFFFFFF
:004A6812 68464A5300 push 00534A46
:004A6817 64A100000000 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000000]
:004A681D 50 push eax
:004A681E 64892500000000 mov dword ptr fs:[00000000], esp
:004A6825 81EC80000000 sub esp, 00000080
:004A682B 8D442404 lea eax, dword ptr [esp+04]
:004A682F 8D4C241C lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+1C]
:004A6833 50 push eax
:004A6834 51 push ecx
:004A6835 C744240C90010000 mov [esp+0C], 00000190
* Reference To: KERNEL32.GetComputerNameA, Ord:00CEh ====>獲得你的
|
:004A683D FF1594A35300 Call dword ptr [0053A394]
:004A6843 8B15545E5700 mov edx, dword ptr [00575E54]
:004A6849 89542400 mov dword ptr [esp], edx
:004A684D 8D44241C lea eax, dword ptr [esp+1C]
:004A6851 8D4C2400 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp] ====>ecx就是你的計算機名
:004A6855 50 push eax
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"%s"
|
:004A6856 6824C45600 push 0056C424
:004A685B 51 push ecx
:004A685C C784249400000000000000 mov dword ptr [esp+00000094], 00000000
:004A6867 E892220600 call 00508AFE
:004A686C 83C40C add esp, 0000000C
:004A686F 8D4C2400 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp]
:004A6873 6A00 push 00000000
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"OEMCOMPUTER" ====>計算機名的比較，以下都是
|
:004A6875 68F8215700 push 005721F8
:004A687A E84C1F0600 call 005087CB
:004A687F 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A6881 0F84EB000000 je 004A6972 ====>跳！？這個太長了，我們用下面的
:004A6887 6A00 push 00000000
看來作者自己留下了一個後門，就是有以上這些名字的機器，可以不帶狗執行，當然還要驗證。可能是他們開發組的區域網裡的機器，我猜。
繼續
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"147"
.....
省略 |
.....
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"FAZURE"
|
:004A68E9 68D8215700 push 005721D8
:004A68EE 8D4C2408 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+08]
:004A68F2 E8D41E0600 call 005087CB
:004A68F7 85C0 test eax, eax
:004A68F9 7477 je 004A6972 ====>跳！？我們用這個，jmp [eb77]比較短好改！
:004A68FB 6A00 push 00000000
* Possible StringData Ref from Data Obj ->"WCZGN"
.....
省略 |
.....
最後來到這裡.
* Referenced by a (U)nconditional or (C)onditional Jump at Address:
|:004A69B1(C)
|
:004A69BC 8D4C240C lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+0C]
:004A69C0 C684248C00000000 mov byte ptr [esp+0000008C], 00
:004A69C8 E87E890600 call 0050F34B
:004A69CD 8D4C2404 lea ecx, dword ptr [esp+04]
:004A69D1 C784248C000000FFFFFFFF mov dword ptr [esp+0000008C], FFFFFFFF
:004A69DC E81F840600 call 0050EE00
:004A69E1 8B8C2484000000 mov ecx, dword ptr [esp+00000084]
:004A69E8 8BC6 mov eax, esi ====>到這裡，esi的值給eax，如果是1，那就辦了
:004A69EA 5E pop esi
:004A69EB 64890D00000000 mov dword ptr fs:[00000000], ecx
:004A69F2 81C48C000000 add esp, 0000008C
:004A69F8 C3 ret
:004A69F9 90 nop ====>看到這裡的90嗎，我們正好用他們。
:004A69FA 90 nop ====>估計以前是花指令，這次他們忘了放！
:004A69FB 90 nop
:004A69FC 90 nop
:004A69FD 90 nop
:004A69FE 90 nop
:004A69FF 90 nop
這次我們直接改這個call的返回值eax，分析得知eax＝1是我們需要的。
上次沒看到有2個地方呼叫這個call，失誤，不過是他們這個版本增加的。
我們把004A69F8 C3 ret這句推後，插入一句mov eax，01，機器碼b801000000，還富裕兩個90呢！
改:004A68F9 7477 je 004A6972
為:004A68F9 eb77 jmp 004A6972
改:004A69F8 C3 ret
:004A69F9 90 nop ====>看到這裡的90嗎，我們正好用他們。
:004A69FA 90 nop ====>估計以前是花指令，這次他們忘了放！
:004A69FB 90 nop
:004A69FC 90 nop
:004A69FD 90 nop
為:004A69F8 B801000000 mov eax，00000001
:004A69FD C3 ret
當然還有另外直接改檢測狗的方法，較麻煩。好幾個Call要改，就不廢話了。
這次還是利用它的後門。 下次，建議作者關閉這個後門吧。雖然還是防不住。
大功告成，無限制。
總結：不要太相信狗的保護能力，在軟體中保護不要太脆弱。這個軟體裡有很多花指令，又有何用？打狗要有耐心，恆心，要多仔細觀察.
建議作者別為自己方便，也給他人方便。
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